China’s criticism of Japan is intensifying rapidly. Within the context of China-Japan relations, the current campaign is unprecedented by any historical measure. It has three distinct characteristics.
First, following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about Taiwan on November 7, 2025, critics in China doubled down on existing issues, including the problem of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and the theory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty’s invalidity, expanding them into a narrative of “new militarism.” More recently, the scope of the rhetoric has widened further, to include the 80th anniversary of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East along with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895. When a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessel transited the Taiwan Strait on April 17, 2026, Chinese critics were quick to note that the date coincided with the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, suggesting it had been deliberately chosen. From a Japanese government perspective, while officials may recall the year of the treaty, it is extremely rare to remember the exact date; this particular line of criticism likely came as a complete surprise. Beijing has thus assembled a remarkably diverse arsenal of grievances, ranging from the Treaty of Shimonoseki to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and from Fukushima to “new militarism.” The sheer breadth of the campaign is one of its defining features.
Second, the criticism has been accompanied by concrete action. Punitive measures, including a suspension of seafood imports, restrictions on rare earth exports, the application of security provisions, and restrictions on travel to Japan, are gradually expanding. The verbal and the material are thus working in tandem. Moreover, the discourse criticizing Japan is deeply intertwined with China’s broader Western Pacific policy: the theory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty’s invalidity feeds the argument that Taiwan’s undetermined status is not recognized, and that Okinawa’s status is similarly unresolved. Within China, the government has firmly defined Taiwan’s status and expressed strong doubts about any undetermined-status theory derived from the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As for Okinawa, however, it is only “scholars” who are advancing the undetermined-status argument; the government has made no explicit statements on the matter. The rhetoric surrounding Taiwan and Okinawa, and the criticism of Japan, is thus linked to China’s military push beyond the First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain, and above all to its policy of unifying Taiwan with the mainland.
Third, there is the question of coordination with domestic debates within Japan. The intent appears to be not only to demonstrate to the Chinese public that voices in Japan sympathize with China’s position, but also to resonate with specific segments of Japanese public opinion and drive a wedge within Japanese society.
One example is the extensive coverage by Chinese media of the anti-constitutional-amendment rally led by opposition parties during Japan’s Constitution Day in May 2026, with Chinese outlets expressing strong sympathy for the demonstrators. A CCTV report on the rally featured Japanese opposition lawmakers. Such coverage is being translated into Japanese and circulating online in Japan. The quality of Chinese media’s Japanese-language output is notably high, attributable perhaps either to the use of AI or the employment of Japanese staff. Chinese media coverage is also influencing Western outlets; similar arguments are now appearing regularly in English and other languages. A consistent pattern in such reports is to characterize the Takaichi government’s security policy revisions, which are responses to China’s growing military capabilities, shifts in U.S. strategy, and changes in the nature of warfare, as “new militarism” — framing a response to new realities as a reversion to old ones.
The Japanese government has not reacted with undue sensitivity to this wave of criticism. It likely calculates that responding to every provocation would only feed the escalation. It has, however, mounted some effective rebuttals. For example, in November 2025, the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo posted on social media, invoking the “enemy state clause” in the UN Charter, stating that if Japan, which it equated to an enemy state, were to take any action aimed at a policy of aggression again, the founding members of the United Nations, including China, would have the right to take direct military action without obtaining permission from the UN Security Council. In response, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) posted on social media that a resolution concerning the enemy state clause in the UN Charter had been adopted at the 1995 UN General Assembly, and that the clause was understood to have already become obsolete. The post noted that China itself had voted in favor of the resolution at the time and criticized China’s statement as inconsistent with the UN’s judgment.
Such rebuttals remain the exception rather than the rule, however. What should be refuted, to what extent, and by whom? Japan has yet to develop an adequate framework for answering those questions.