Recently, distinguished members of the Indian strategic establishment have argued against binding India to a ‘binary’ choice between “punitive resolve” and “naïve accommodation.” They contend that India is being subjected to a “new normal” that confines it to two stark choices—either to take conventional military action or to do nothing—thereby locking it into a rigid posture. In their view, this narrows India’s strategic options by placing greater weight on domestic political considerations. They further contend that, since the Balakot attack did not deter Pakistan from sponsoring the Pahalgam terror attack, the strategy of overt kinetic action must be completely dispensed with.
Two conclusions can be derived here. First, the foregoing assessment mischaracterises and distorts India’s actual responses to Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism.
Second, it overlooks the fact that a policy of restraint in overt kinetic action, coupled with an exclusive reliance on covert action, tethers India to the very rigidities that critics attribute to an exclusively overt strategy. Similarly, shortly before becoming Union External Affairs Minister (EAM), S. Jaishankar remarked that India should preserve strategic flexibility in responding to Pakistan.
Critics of overt action must therefore explain why repeated instances of Indian restraint following Pakistani terrorist attacks on Indian soil failed to induce Pakistani restraint, including after the 1993 Mumbai bomb attacks, the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre, the 2001 Parliament attack, and the 2008 Mumbai 26/11 attacks. Instead, what India needs is a blend of covert and overt action to respond to Pakistani sub-conventional and terrorist attacks.
The Limits of a Binary Choice
Pakistani terrorism, which emerges overwhelmingly from the jihadi Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) tanzeems[1], based primarily in Pakistan’s Punjab province and, to a more limited extent, in adjoining regions such as Sindh, Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, requires a robust Indian response. The conventional military muscularity that undergirded India’s responses—starting with the Uri attack and continuing through the Balakot and Op Sindoor airstrikes—must remain integral to New Delhi’s strategy against Pakistani terrorism. Lest we forget, these conventional responses were separated by intervals of three years (post-Uri) and six years (post-Balakot). If anything, overt kinetic action has been pursued more sparingly than critics contend. New Delhi has also been reactive, escalating conventionally only in response to Pakistani terrorist attacks. New Delhi has remained on the defensive – literally ceding the initiative to Pakistan, allowing the latter to initiate a terror attack before considering any overt kinetic response.
Covert action has been a more prominent and frequent feature of India’s strategy than overt conventional kinetic action. In any case, covert action is difficult to prove and cannot be acknowledged owing to secrecy and plausible deniability. What matters are the outcomes, and there have been several attacks on Pakistani forces in the last decade—whether in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through cross-Line of Control (LoC) Indian Army (IA) commando raids into POJK, or, on a more limited scale, in Pakistani Punjab.
Covert action has been a more prominent and frequent feature of India’s strategy than overt conventional kinetic action.
Yet responses to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism can vary. A distinction must be made between mass-casualty terrorist attacks that can be directly traced to Pakistan and attacks in India’s hinterland where Pakistani involvement is less clear. For the former, a direct and overt response, as demonstrated by the Balakot air strikes and Op Sindoor, is indispensable. For the latter, however, justifying escalation is a more difficult exercise, even when attacks occur in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Consider two prominent examples. In October 2024, six construction workers were killed in a terrorist attack in Ganderbal, J&K. Similarly, in November 2025, the Red Fort bomb attack claimed the lives of 15 people and injured several more. In neither case did the circumstances justify escalating using airpower, as occurred in February 2019 and May 2025.
Preventing attacks within the hinterland requires strong counter-intelligence and security capabilities, even where there are indications of Pakistani involvement. Indeed, Pakistan is likely to work through local accomplices to execute terrorist attacks to conceal its tracks.
Towards a Multi-Pronged Strategy of Coercion
To revisit EAM S. Jaishankar’s remarks before he assumed office in 2019, the “new normal” of overt kinetic action requires time to produce its intended effects. It has been only seven years since the 2019 Balakot air strikes; therefore, it is premature to conclude that Indian deterrence against Pakistani mass-casualty terrorism has been a complete failure. There will likely be several more Op Sindoor-type missions that may expand across the land, naval, cyber, and space domains, as well as the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS). Over time, repeated use of conventional force[2] by India in response to terrorist attacks such as Pulwama and Pahalgam could reinforce deterrence by sending a “costly [coercive] signal”[3] that Rawalpindi can no longer assume India will exercise conventional kinetic restraint. This will create a reputational effect by bolstering New Delhi’s credibility for purposive and robust action. By contrast, the policy of strict restraint towards overt action has been tested, found wanting, and run its course.
There are also reputational consequences for inaction in the face of terrorist attacks such as 26/11, Pulwama, and Pahalgam, in particular. The latter has built a reputation for action by embracing calculated risk-taking through overt conventional counterforce operations against Pakistan-sponsored mass casualty terrorism, marking a sharp departure from the responses and practices of previous governments. Reverting to the long-standing strategy of restraint in the face of brazen acts of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism would undermine the government’s credibility.
Beyond overt and covert military action, India has also placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion and attrition.[4] The move has drawn a strong response from Pakistan, suggesting that it may already be exerting strategic pressure.
In short, India has embraced a more variegated and multi-pronged strategy against Pakistan than critics give it credit for.
Beyond overt and covert military action, India has also placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion and attrition.
However, it faces two key challenges. The first is securing Pakistan’s return to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list, although the government is likely to face resistance from other members of the body. The second is ensuring that Indian forces are adequately prepared for the next round of escalation following a Pakistan-sponsored mass-casualty terror attack, which is likely to be more severe and sharper. Both elements warrant close attention going forward.
Ultimately, the choice is not between overt action and restraint, but between strategic rigidity and strategic flexibility. Preserving a calibrated mix of military, covert, diplomatic and economic instruments will leave India better placed to deter Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
[1] C. Christine Fair, In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 115-117.
[2] Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 15-26.
[3] Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Themes for the 21st Century), 2004, p. 38.
[4] Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2013), pp. 108–109.
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