Amid tensions in the Middle East, China is tightening its control over the South China Sea.
Satellite imagery shows Chinese vessels have erected a floating barrier at the entrance to Scarborough Shoal, a disputed fishing reef within the Philippines’s exclusive economic zone. The deployment restricts Filipino access to the shoal, where Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels have long harassed Philippine boats and disrupted fishing activity.
China’s actions move beyond routine harassment to more direct restrictions on access. They reflect a broader pattern: Beijing is using gray-zone tactics to assert operational control over contested waters while staying below the threshold for armed conflict and limiting the risk of a direct U.S. response. These incremental steps, while individually limited, cumulatively shift the status quo in Beijing’s favor without triggering a kinetic response.
China Expands Airpower in the South China Sea
In addition to its recent build-up at Scarborough Shoal, China is expanding its military footprint elsewhere in the South China Sea. Satellite imagery indicates Beijing is constructing a large airbase on Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands. The project covers roughly 1,500 acres of reclaimed land—significantly larger than nearby military facilities such as Woody Island, one of China’s most militarized outposts in the Paracels.
The new base includes a long runway capable of supporting a more persistent air presence, improving China’s ability to conduct patrols, monitor foreign activity, and respond more quickly to incidents across the region. Paired with tighter access at Scarborough, the buildup suggests Beijing is combining localized pressure with growing military reach to reinforce its position across contested waters.
China Increases Airspace Controls and Maritime Coordination Around Taiwan
China is also using airspace controls to shape activity around Taiwan. Beijing recently issued notices restricting access to large swaths of offshore airspace for up to 40 days — far longer than typical military exercises — without announcing drills or offering an explanation. The restricted areas cover key approaches in the East China Sea and northern Taiwan Strait, including major routes used by both civilian and military aircraft. The move points to a shift from short-duration exercises to more sustained readiness, allowing China to manage activity in critical air corridors without the visibility of large-scale operations.
At sea, China is also scaling up its coordinated use of civilian vessels. Thousands of Chinese fishing boats recently assembled into organized formations spanning more than 200 miles in the East China Sea, near major shipping lanes between China, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. The scale and coordination of these formations suggest they could be used in a crisis to obstruct traffic, complicate military operations, and support quarantine or blockade scenarios, highlighting Beijing’s ability to mobilize civilian forces at scale to support gray-zone operations.
The United States and Allies Should Counter China’s Expanding Forward Presence
Washington and its partners should respond by strengthening distributed military access, improving allied air defense resilience, and expanding surveillance across contested waters. This includes ensuring U.S. and allied forces can operate from a wider network of locations across the region, complicating China’s ability to target fixed positions and sustain pressure over time.
The United States should also accelerate defense cooperation with frontline partners such as the Philippines, including hardening airfields, pre-positioning supplies, and improving runway repair capabilities at vulnerable bases.
The United States should likewise work with allies to increase the tempo of combined patrols and reconnaissance missions in the South China Sea. In practice, Washington and its partners should sustain a regular presence in contested areas by flying and sailing where access is internationally recognized, directly challenging excessive maritime claims and efforts to regulate transit.
A more visible multinational presence can challenge Beijing’s efforts to normalize control over disputed areas and impose costs on incremental encroachment, while continued support for maritime domain awareness will help regional partners track Chinese activity and document coercive behavior.
Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and senior director of FDD’s China Program, where Duncan Lazarow is an intern. For more analysis from Craig and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Craig on X @CraigMSingleton. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.