The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, which the World Bank brokered between India and Pakistan, was a notable achievement in South Asian diplomacy. The treaty divided the six rivers of the Indus basin between the two countries. The three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, were allocated to Pakistan, while the three eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, went to India. India was also permitted limited non-consumptive use of the western rivers, primarily for hydropower, but the treaty explicitly prohibited any changes to water flows that could undermine Pakistan’s access to its share of water. For decades, this framework helped in managing a vital shared resource amid persistent rivalry between the two countries.
Last year, however, India decided to hold the treaty in abeyance following a terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, that killed 26 people. New Delhi blamed Islamabad for the incident without presenting convincing evidence. Pakistan formally denied the allegations and has called for a neutral and independent investigation.
India has ramped up infrastructure development on the western rivers since May 2025. This includes fast-tracking bids for new projects, such as the Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel and the expansion of the Ranbir Canal. India has also stopped sharing hydrological data for the western rivers with Pakistan’s Commissioner for Indus Waters.
These infrastructure changes are coupled with aggressive rhetoric from Indian officials, who claim that “not a single drop of water will flow to Pakistan.” Consequently, these projects have created a sense of political and strategic urgency in Islamabad. Pakistani policymakers now increasingly view these moves as part of a broader Indian strategy to weaponize water and exert pressure on Pakistan.
The Pakistan government recently organized a seminar in Islamabad that brought together civilian leaders, climate experts, and civil-military officials to discuss the growing threat from India’s weaponization of the Indus waters. The discussions focused on protecting Pakistan’s water rights under the treaty and exploring legal and diplomatic avenues to counter India’s actions. Participants broadly emphasized that Pakistan’s rights are legally protected under the IWT and the country is obligated to enforce the treaty mechanisms to defend its share of water at all costs.
Its long-standing defensive posture in this regard appears to have recently evolved into explicit signaling that military force is an option it will take recourse to if India’s water diversions jeopardize the country’s survival. Addressing the severity of the situation, Defense Minister Khawaja Asif recently emphasized that Pakistan would not hesitate to go to war if its water security is breached.
This sentiment was mirrored by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari during his address at the Islamabad seminar. Highlighting the need for a robust defense framework, he explicitly tied the water crisis to national military preparedness. “The strangulation of water is an existential threat… It is only rational to ask what are we doing in terms of military preparedness as India continues to pursue such measures,” he cautioned.
Pakistan’s military leadership has backed the civilian government’s red lines by signaling its own institutional readiness to act. On July 6, following a Corps Commanders Conference chaired by General Asim Munir, the military top brass issued a formal declaration supporting the water treaty. “The Forum, taking note of Indian rhetoric surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), reaffirmed the guidance given in the National Security Committee (NSC) directive of 24 April 2025. The Forum expressed resolute commitment to undertake all measures necessary to ensure availability of Pakistan’s rightful share of water as per the directives of the Government and inspirations of the people of Pakistan,” it said.
Pakistan has long opposed Indian projects on the western rivers as it views many of them as violating the IWT. Last month, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar criticized 17 such Indian initiatives, including hydropower facilities, as “tools for hydro-hegemony.”
It seems that for Pakistan, the core issue extends beyond individual hydropower projects. The deeper concern lies in the prospect of accumulated upstream control, which India could exercise without the treaty’s disciplinary constraints. As Pakistan’s Commissioner for Indus Waters Syed Muhammad Mehar Ali Shah noted recently, Islamabad does not object to lawful hydropower development, but “unlawful control, excessive discretion, and opaque operations” pose significant problems.
In recent months, Pakistan has secured notable legal victories in international forums regarding its water-sharing dispute with India under the IWT. For instance, a recent ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration affirmed Islamabad’s position on the IWT, placing “substantive limits on India’s water-control capability” on the western rivers. The ruling has strengthened Pakistan’s legal standing and claims over the IWT violations.
It is important to note that the IWT includes an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism that begins at the bilateral level through the Permanent Indus Commission. Should that fail to work out differences, the process can then advance without deadlock to neutral experts or arbitration.
However, India’s apparent disregard for these channels has prompted a broader debate in Pakistan about additional measures, including political initiatives, diplomatic campaigns, and strategic defense mechanisms to safeguard its sovereignty and address what is officially perceived as a highly politicized and militarized approach by New Delhi to water issues.
In recent weeks, policymakers, political leaders, and experts in Pakistan have been unanimous in describing the IWT as far more than a hydrological arrangement. It is a matter of national security, they say.
A widely prevailing view in Pakistan is that it should defend its water rights using all available means. This shift in emphasis, from strictly legal recourse to broader sovereign options, also signals that Islamabad still hopes the situation has not escalated beyond rhetoric in India involving stopping Pakistan’s share of water. The ongoing criticism in Pakistan of India’s moves in this regard should serve as a reminder to New Delhi that adherence to the treaty serves the best interests of both countries and the wider region.
Moreover, there is growing eagerness in Pakistan to involve China more directly in the issue. As the upper riparian country similar to India on the Indus, China’s role has gained relevance in Pakistani arguments. If India can unilaterally suspend a treaty and threaten the rights of a lower riparian like Pakistan, the logic goes, then China could similarly become a party to such dynamics.
During the recent seminar in Islamabad, analysts pointed out that the Indus and its major tributaries originate in the Himalayas and the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, which means that India is not the ultimate upstream country in this dynamic. This argument implies that by establishing a precedent of cutting off water to a downstream neighbor, Pakistan, India may carelessly expose itself to comparable pressures from its own upper riparian neighbor in the future. This is not a good precedent for regional security.
In this regard, proposals discussed at the Islamabad meeting included expanding the treaty into a trilateral framework with China and developing an internationally supported code of conduct for transboundary rivers between India, Pakistan and China. Such ideas suggest that China’s influence or role in regional water matters, particularly the issue of IWT, is likely to increase in the future.
The politicization of the IWT carries adverse risks for regional stability and, for Pakistan, the stakes are existential. Pakistan’s status as a lower riparian state means its irrigation, reservoirs, industry, and growing population depend entirely on stable upstream river flows. Any fluctuation in the timing or volume of these flows is a major strategic threat that directly impacts the country’s broader national, food, energy and economic security.
Moreover, environmental challenges, which are being intensified by climate change, including glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and shifting patterns, further underscore the need for the treaty to adapt to current realities instead of becoming dysfunctional, heavily politicized, or a recurring source of bilateral friction. Ideally, both countries can benefit from renewed negotiations that address these evolving requirements, challenges and dynamics.
Going forward, Pakistan’s challenge lies in mounting an effective diplomatic and legal response to counter India’s moves and to convince New Delhi that weaponizing water will prove counterproductive. The coming months will be critical in determining whether the IWT can withstand current pressures or whether South Asia is heading toward a new and dangerous chapter defined by the water conflict between Pakistan and India.