The United Arab Emirates’ decision to leave the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) and the wider OPEC+ alliance on May 1, 2026, “reflects a policy-driven evolution aligned with long-term market fundamentals,” Suhail al-Mazrouei, the Emirati energy minister, said on X.
“The time has come to focus our efforts on what our national interest dictates and our commitment to our investors, customers, partners and global energy markets,” he wrote.
According to the Emirati WAM news agency, disruptions in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz influenced the decision.
As part of the wider US-Israel war in Iran, Tehran had attacked the United Arab Emirates with thousands of drones and missiles, killing civilians, damaging infrastructure and oil-producing facilities, while also targeting US bases.
However, Abu Dhabi’s calls for a joint military response by the Gulf states to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — a key waterway for the transport of one-fifth of global oil supplies, including much of the UAE’s — after Tehran closed it off, failed to gain traction, with Saudi Arabia in particular pushing instead for a diplomatic approach.
“The war created a strategic opening,” Kristian Alexander, senior fellow at the Abu Dhabi-based think tank Rabdan Security and Defense Institute, told DW.
He believes that there was an underlying logic that predated the conflict with Iran. The UAE announced its decision at a time when Gulf exports are limited and oil markets are tight, allowing it to present the move as a way to improve future supply responsiveness, he said.
“Once Hormuz access improves again, Abu Dhabi will gain more freedom to operate like a commercially agile energy exporter rather than one constrained by cartel discipline,” Alexander added.
UAE could make other moves
Sami Hamdi, managing director of the London-based risk-intelligence advisor The International Interest, points to a further aspect of the announcement.
“It is worth noting that it happened on the same day Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted a summit with regional leaders to create a unified front on Iran’s blockage of the Strait of Hormuz,” he told DW. “It’s almost as if the UAE was saying to Saudi Arabia, we will not be led by you anymore,” Hamdi said.
He wouldn’t rule out that the UAE could next withdraw from the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC — a political and economic alliance of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman that cooperate on many fronts, including joint military actions and economic integration — or the Arab League, a regional organization of 22 Arab states.
Cinzia Bianco, a Gulf analyst at the European Council on Foreign Relations, also believes that “more is coming.”
Ahead of Tuesday’s summit in Saudi Arabia, she wrote on X that the “UAE sending Foreign Minister to extraordinary GCC meeting in Jeddah as others send Heads of State is a clear indication they are unhappy. UAE leaves OPEC and OPEC+, but I believe this is not big enough to reflect the level of their frustration and their insistence that they will make a move to shake everything up.”
However, a UAE official told the news agency Reuters on Wednesday that, for the time being, no further exits are planned.
Strained ties with Riyadh
Observers agree that the more imminent risk is further straining relations with Saudi Arabia and exposing the UAE to accusations of opportunism amid regional tensions.
Even before the disagreement over the Strait of Hormuz closure, the two countries had already been backing opposing parties in Sudan, Libya and Yemen.
Although both countries remain close US allies, the UAE signed a US-brokered normalization deal with Israel in 2020, while Saudi Arabia stalled such negotiations after the Hamas terror attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing two-year-war in Gaza.
“Abu Dhabi views its ties with Washington and Israel as vital security channels while remaining independent in decision-making on energy, investment, China, and regional diplomacy,” Alexander said.
Despite this, he believes that the UAE, as well as Saudi Arabia, will avoid any open rupture for now as political cohesion among the Gulf countries still carries security value.
“While I believe that the UAE’s exit will not necessarily trigger a direct confrontation with Riyadh, it underlines that the two Gulf powers are increasingly pursuing parallel national development models that cooperate when useful, while competing intensely when interests diverge.”
However, this doesn’t mean that the countries won’t turn into bitter rivals in the medium to long term, he notes.
“Saudi-UAE competition could sharpen across several domains: oil market share, logistics, tourism, financial services, technology, AI investment, and efforts to attract foreign direct investment,” Alexander said.
Expensive reforms in UAE and Saudi Arabia
Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, or MBZ, and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, have been pouring resources into major economic transformation plans — known as Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia and UAE 2031, which aim to reduce reliance on oil and turn the countries into regional hubs for digital infrastructure, tourism, business and investment.
However, Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s biggest oil exporter and much larger in geographical and population size than the UAE, has been prioritizing higher oil prices over increased output for years.
“In contrast, the UAE has spent heavily to expand production capacity, while OPEC+ constraints limited how much of that capacity could be monetized,” Alexander said. The UAE will not even need to find new buyers, as it already has long-standing energy relationships with major Asian consumers such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.
There are also other indirect financial dimensions worth noting, he adds.
“The UAE dirham remains pegged to the US dollar, and global oil trade continues to be overwhelmingly denominated in dollars,” he said. “As a result, higher UAE oil exports generally translate into stronger foreign exchange inflows, larger fiscal surpluses, and reinforced confidence in the country’s macroeconomic stability.”
Edited by: Rob Mudge