Recent diplomacy suggests that India’s China policy is entering a more nuanced phase. During his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Manila, Jaishankar discussed restoring practical cooperation, including greater supply-chain predictability and the resumption of institutional mechanisms. But he also reiterated (Opens in new window) that “peace and tranquillity in the border areas is obviously the prerequisite for normal ties”. This contrast sums up India’s emerging strategy of expanding engagement without restoring trust.
China has signalled a willingness to stabilise bilateral ties ahead of the BRICS summit. It is already visible in a series of practical confidence-building measures, including the resumption of border trade (Opens in new window) through Nathu La, Lipulekh and Shipki La, alongside discussions on direct flights, visas, and institutional exchanges.
China views BRICS as a vehicle for expanding its influence (Opens in new window) within global governance, whereas India supports a more representative international order, remaining committed to its autonomy. So, if Xi arrives in New Delhi, the most important signal will not be that India and China have reconciled. It will be that New Delhi has accepted a more durable reality: China is a rival that cannot be ignored, isolated or transformed. For India, it is recognition that a fragmented international environment requires keeping multiple diplomatic options open. As BRICS chair (Opens in new window) this year, New Delhi has an added incentive to ensure that competition with Beijing does not derail multilateral cooperation.
China remains India’s largest neighbour, a major trading partner (Opens in new window) and an indispensable actor in every major question shaping Asia’s future. Climate change, regional stability, and multilateral institutions all require engagement with Beijing (Opens in new window). If that is true, then engagement cannot wait for a comprehensive political settlement. It has to occur despite the absence of one. This amounts to a strategy of managed rivalry. India will continue to strengthen deterrence along the border and to restore selected channels of diplomatic engagement.
India’s objective is not to choose between engagement and balancing, or between cooperation and confrontation. It is to preserve the flexibility to do all of these as circumstances require. In that regard, many will interpret India’s renewed engagement with China as another example of hedging between Washington and Beijing. That misses the point. If India is hedging, it is hedging against uncertainty about China’s future behaviour rather than against competition between great powers.