International media loves to view every Taiwan election as a contest between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan’s future. In this telling, Taiwan is an object of great power contestation, rather than a vibrant democracy in its own right. Taiwan presidential candidates at times feed into this fallacy by framing election campaigns around conflicting approaches over how best to deal with China.
Global and local events may be converging to render such political strategies moot for upcoming elections. Social and economic pain points, more than geopolitical competition, could define Taiwan’s political direction over the next two years. If this proves to be the case, it could be a welcome development. The Taiwan people deserve a serious choice between competing visions from major political parties and their leaders for how to improve quality of life and access to opportunity.
For the DPP, it is hard to see a path to winning the 2028 presidential election on cross-Strait and external issues. President Trump has — and will continue to — undercut everything President William Lai (賴清德) does to try to promote a perception of solid US-Taiwan relations as protection against Beijing’s encroachment. Trump simply does not view it as America’s responsibility to defend Taiwan. He is not invested in Lai’s political fortunes and will not show public support for him. His administration will not uniformly support or oppose any candidate or political party. While Trump is determined to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait, he also prioritizes his relationship with Xi Jinping (習近平). Trump will continue to be heavily influenced by Xi’s concerns and sensitivities relating to Taiwan.
At the same time, Beijing is unlikely to boost the KMT’s fortunes, even if it seeks to do so. Beijing could try to sharpen its rhetoric and actions against Lai and the DPP and promise benefits for Taiwan’s people if the KMT returns to power. Even if it does so, such rhetoric will be belied by observable Chinese behavior.
China will continue to test and employ new military capabilities for Taiwan contingencies. The PLA will continue to operate near Taiwan’s southern, northern, eastern, and western shores. Beijing also will continue to attempt to influence Taiwan’s domestic attitudes through cyber and AI-driven disinformation campaigns. Xi almost certainly will secure a fourth term as leader at the 21st Party Congress in the months leading up to Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election. Against that backdrop, it will be challenging to sell an idea of China proffering benefits to Taiwan if the KMT returns to power.
In other words, no political party will be able to claim that Washington or Beijing offers solutions to day-to-day challenges the people of Taiwan face. It will remain a prerequisite for any aspiring leader to present a theory of the case for protecting Taiwan and sustaining productive relations with the United States. This will be a threshold issue, though, not a determinative one in upcoming elections. More than external issues, domestic stresses like legislative gridlock and the livelihood crunch could hold the greatest sway over the outcomes at the ballot box.
In 2024, Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) leader Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) saw political opportunity in these domestic stresses and offered voters a “third way” between the DPP and the KMT for addressing them. He promised to focus on bread-and-butter issues like housing, affordability, and jobs. His pitch garnered 26 percent of the presidential vote. With Ko sidelined by legal challenges and no heir apparent in the TPP possessing the charisma and energy to take his place on the presidential ballot, this voting bloc of mostly young, independent-minded, and economically alienated voters will be up for grabs. They could very well swing upcoming elections.
Taiwan’s democratic system presently is underperforming in addressing these domestic challenges. Taiwan’s legislature is failing to deliver on its most fundamental duties, such as the 2026 national budget and the confirmation process for the Constitutional Court and the Central Election Commission. Voters could punish whoever they decide is the cause of such legislative paralysis.
Meanwhile, Taiwan is suffering from a dual-speed economy: growing wealth for workers connected to the technology sector and stagnating real wages for everyone else. If the ruling DPP does not find ways to translate Taiwan’s technology boom into more affordable rent and better job opportunities, then voters’ economic frustrations could color their electoral decisions.
As Brookings scholar Richard Bush wrote in his book Difficult Choices, “democracy is not just a system for selecting leaders through free and fair elections and for debating the issues of the day without fear. It also is a system that vests in those elected leaders the obligation of good performance for the benefit of society as a whole.”
Upcoming elections in Taiwan present an opportunity for Taiwan’s leaders to engage in a contest of ideas for how to promote security and the good life in Taiwan. There certainly will be a debate about how best to counter the PRC’s ambitions. As the Taiwan public grows more psychologically resilient to PRC pressure, though, there also will be opportunities for candidates to offer bold new ideas for addressing challenges at home.
Traditionally, the “nine-in-one” local elections are about issues like garbage collection and infrastructure development, whereas presidential elections focus more on national identity and cross-Strait relations. The 2028 presidential election may break that pattern and feel more like a local election. The DPP will not be able to tout support from Trump, and the KMT will be challenged to promise breakthroughs with Beijing. This could push the field of debate back to domestic issues. Whichever party garners the greatest public confidence in its capacity to deliver jobs, affordable housing, and opportunities for upward mobility will enjoy electoral success.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.