India is transforming Great Nicobar Island, its southernmost territory in the Bay of Bengal, into a major strategic asset.
Located at the tip of the Andaman and Nicobar chain, closer to Indonesia’s Sumatra than to the Indian mainland, the island sits near the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors.
New Delhi is investing about $9 billion (€8.3 billion) to build a transshipment port, airport, township and supporting infrastructure.
However, the project also faces criticism over its environmental and social impact, including the felling of about 852,000 trees and risks to Indigenous communities such as the Shompen.
New Delhi banking on geography to gain power
The scale reflects a shift in New Delhi’s strategic thinking, from focusing more on India’s mainland to a more outward-looking maritime posture.
Geographic advantages are obvious: Proximity to the Malacca Strait offers the ability to monitor one of the main arteries of global trade, including a significant share of China‘s energy flows.
But what that proximity delivers in military terms is contested.
Former Air Marshal R Nambiar argues that the real value of Great Nicobar Island is that it allows India to deny potential rivals control of the region.
“We do not need to project power. We need to deny the adversary passage through our backyard,” Nambiar told DW.
He pointed to the challenges of facing a “blue-water navy” — a navy capable of operating globally, far away from its native shores — from an opponent that matches or surpasses India’s own capabilities.
“India must prepare to face a ‘peer-plus’ navy, where large surface fleets are increasingly exposed to precision strikes and aerospace power. A blue-water navy that cannot first survive… controls nothing,” said Nambiar.
“Land base is unsinkable. We should focus on choke points and use geography to our advantage,” he added.
China’s growing presence in Indian Ocean
In India’s strategic thinking, these calculations are usually focused on China — its regional rival and the only nation in the world competing with it in terms of population.
Beijing has spent two decades building influence across the Indian Ocean, securing port access in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Djibouti, deploying submarines and surveillance ships with increasing regularity, and mapping sea beds in regions that Indian planners regard as their strategic backyard.
Great Nicobar is, in part, India’s answer to that accumulation of pressure.
Last week, former Air Chief Marshal R K S Bhadauria pointed out that building new infrastructure will mark a pivotal development in India’s capability to secure its trade routes and to dominate the maritime environment whenever required.
“Strategically, it is crucial to understand that this will provide us with the capability to position ourselves just 150 kilometers away from the Strait of Malacca. Our overall domain awareness, both in the air and maritime spheres, will receive a significant boost,” said Bhadauria in an interview with the Press Trust of India (PTI).
Tracking China’s footprint around Great Nicobar
But countering China’s military power is only one part of India’s equation for developing Great Nicobar.
Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor of Chinese studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told DW the driver of the project is “economic first, strategic second.”
“If you look at China, it has developed around 3,000 islands since the 1990s, and a significant share of its economic activity now flows through them,” he said.
“India is trying to do something similar,” he added, pointing to plans at the island’s Galathea Bay to build a transshipment terminal, an airport, township and energy infrastructure “to boost trade and reduce dependence.”
He warned that China’s presence in the Indian Ocean cannot be ignored.
“China is sending submarines every year and over nine surveillance ships annually. We have seen Chinese vessels docking in Male after passing near the Andaman and Nicobar chain, and earlier at Hambantota, despite Indian concerns,” said the expert.
“China monitors Indian space launches from Great Coco Island, is mapping the Bay of Bengal, and is expanding fishing activity in the Indian Ocean while restricting access in the South China Sea.”
For Kondapalli, this duality defines the project.
“The infrastructure being built is economic in intent, but can be used for military purposes depending on the threat level. Its long-term strategic impact remains uncertain,” he added.
India’s long bet on power and presence
The Great Nicobar buildup strengthens India’s operational posture, but there are clear limits to it, said Atul Kumar, a fellow for national security and China studies at the Observer Research Foundation.
“Its development enhances surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance, enabling faster response and more credible deterrence signaling,” he told DW.
“Forward infrastructure on Great Nicobar Island will extend air reach, reduce patrol distances and improve the ability of aircraft and naval assets to remain deployed for longer.”
But he cautioned against overstating its impact.
“It does not provide a chokehold. Sustained interdiction would require far greater capabilities and coordination,” he said.
He said India needed a larger fleet, more submarines and stronger partnerships to translate geography into real control.
That distinction between deterrence and control runs through most serious assessments of the project.
Ashok Kantha, former Indian ambassador to China, said that the island’s geographic position is genuinely valuable, but warned it was too early for “definitive conclusions” on India’s operational power.
“Great Nicobar is being developed to reduce reliance on foreign transshipment hubs, speed humanitarian and disaster response, and strengthen India’s maritime presence in the eastern Indian Ocean,” Kantha told DW.
“Its proximity to the Malacca approaches makes it valuable for monitoring sea lane activity, but converting that geographic advantage into sustained operational power will depend on logistics, force posture, and broader political and economic choices,” he added.
Edited by: Darko Janjevic