The United Arab Emirates’ announcement of its withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ on April 28 marks the fifth voluntary departure in a decade, following Indonesia in 2016, Qatar in 2019, Ecuador in 2020, and Angola in 2024. The decision followed years of friction over the gap between authorized output and Abu Dhabi’s physical capacity of 4.85 million barrels per day, with the 5 million barrel per day capacity target accelerated from 2030 to 2027 and capacity utilization stuck near 66 percent in 2025.
Energy Minister Suhail Al Mazrouei framed the move as a sovereign policy decision uncoordinated with any other member. ADNOC chief executive Sultan Al Jaber told reporters at the May 4 Make-it-in-the-Emirates forum that the decision served UAE national interests and long-term strategic objectives and was not directed against the remaining members.
Nevertheless, the five most recent departures share a pattern. Each producer faced one of three pressures: physical capacity above its OPEC+ quota, oilfields in long-term decline, or budgets making membership costlier than leaving. Each invoked national interest language nearly verbatim. OPEC’s share of global crude has fallen below 30 percent for the first time, and OPEC+ coverage sits at roughly 46 percent.
The question now turns to Kazakhstan, the bloc’s most consistent over-producer. The same pressures that drove Abu Dhabi out apply in Astana, with one physical obstacle (via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium) limiting how soon Kazakhstan could realistically leave.