On April 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded a two-day visit to North Korea – his first trip to Pyongyang in more than six years, where he emphasized strengthening high-level exchanges and expanding practical cooperation. With U.S. President Donald Trump set to arrive in Beijing in mid-May for a high-stakes summit with President Xi Jinping, the visit underscores China’s parallel diplomatic positioning.
Wang’s North Korea trip is only one part of a broader set of initiatives Beijing has been assembling both to shape the regional environment ahead of the summit and to capitalize on Washington’s focus on the war in the Middle East. China is simultaneously shaping the regional security environment, stabilizing and selectively managing economic relations, and positioning itself as a potential diplomatic intermediary. Not every diplomatic move may have been pre-planned, but the cumulative effect is an increasingly coherent posture that seeks to maximize China’s leverage ahead of the summit while preserving flexibility.
The Iran conflict has created a strategic opening by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from Asia. Rather than acting aggressively, China has generally favored a patient approach that prioritizes building influence and keeping options open over immediate, high-profile gains. This reflects a Xi-era pattern in which structural advantage and long-term positioning often take precedence over headline-grabbing confrontation.
The delay of the Trump–Xi summit, from late March to mid-May due to the Iran war, has reinforced these dynamics. Beijing has gained additional time to shape the agenda and explore leverage points on technology controls, investment restrictions, tariffs, and Taiwan. With Washington managing multiple crises, China appears less as a challenger and more as a stabilizing presence, creating an emergent asymmetry likely to influence U.S. expectations and negotiation dynamics.
Reasserting Leverage on the Korean Peninsula
Wang Yi’s April 9-10 visit to Pyongyang offered one of the most strategically revealing elements of China’s pre-summit positioning. Historical precedent is instructive: Kim Jong Un traveled to Beijing in 2018 to steady ties and possibly coordinate positions ahead of his first meeting with Trump in Singapore. While it is impossible to know the full extent of China’s calculations, Beijing appears intent on maintaining centrality in any renewed North Korea-U.S. diplomacy.
There’s a broader context behind Wang’s visit as well. During the pandemic, and amid North Korea’s closer ties with Moscow, Beijing’s influence in Pyongyang waned. The resumption of rail and air links in early 2026 reflected a deliberate effort to prevent developments on the Korean Peninsula from unfolding without Chinese involvement. These incremental steps allow Beijing to assert influence while avoiding overt pressure that could provoke North Korean resistance.
Pyongyang is not a passive actor. Recent missile and other weapons tests, occurring just before Wang’s visit, signal North Korea’s effort to assert autonomy and shape engagement on its terms. Kim Jong Un’s February statement that there is “no reason” North Korea and the United States cannot “get along well,” provided Washington abandons its “hostile” policy, placed the onus on the U.S. while leaving space for maneuver. For Beijing, this ambiguity offers an opportunity to act as an intermediary but does not guarantee that role.
China is gradually consolidating its influence. Even limited North Korea-U.S. agreements could reduce tensions in a way that benefits Beijing, particularly if it retains a supportive role. Over time, successive diplomatic, economic, and security moves may coalesce into a more coherent position on the peninsula, though this remains contingent on Pyongyang’s choices and Washington’s responsiveness.
Strategic Restraint and Soft Power
China’s approach to the Middle East conflict reflects similar incremental logic. By emphasizing restraint and describing the war as one that “should never have happened,” Beijing preserves relationships with regional actors while avoiding overt alignment with any party. This posture allows diplomatic flexibility and reinforces its image as a stabilizing actor.
As Gulf states and European partners grow wary of an unpredictable United States, Beijing can appear as a reliable interlocutor, cultivating credibility in multiple arenas. Repeated demonstrations of restraint and offers of mediation may gradually strengthen China’s influence without requiring direct conflict resolution. The strategic patience approach signals competence and reliability, contrasting with U.S. unpredictability, and subtly elevates China as an alternative reference point for regional actors.
Gulf states and other Global South actors are observing both U.S. and Chinese approaches to conflict management, mediation, and diplomacy. Through patient engagement, Beijing enhances its soft power, projecting itself as a capable, responsible actor able to manage crises without resorting to force.
Incremental successes – such as resumed rail links with North Korea, measured economic reciprocity, or quiet mediation in the Middle East – may cumulatively enhance China’s credibility, reinforcing its bargaining position with Washington.
These third-party perceptions matter for the summit because they shape expectations and influence U.S. calculations indirectly. A Washington that is aware of Chinese influence among regional partners may approach negotiations with a heightened sense of constraint, further amplifying China’s leverage even in areas where the U.S. retains traditional dominance.
Economic and Trade Talks
On trade and technology, China’s objectives are both defensive and opportunistic. Beijing seeks relief from U.S. export controls in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other high-tech sectors, the removal of sanctions on hundreds of firms, and reduced restrictions on outbound investment. Simultaneously, China is signaling its willingness to increase purchases of U.S. goods – including agricultural products, energy, and aircraft – as bargaining chips. Taken as a whole, China’s negotiating posture is aimed at reducing asymmetries while avoiding direct confrontation.
The issue of China’s export ban on rare earths, which nearly derailed relations in 2025, appears to be advancing at the ministerial level. Consultations are continuing despite the summit delay.
China’s negotiations over technology and trade are not purely transactional; they function as signals of credibility and reliability to multiple audiences, including the Global South, Europe, and regional partners in East Asia.
Taiwan remains the most sensitive topic. Beijing is likely to press Washington for restraint in arms sales and for explicit opposition to independence. Trump’s transactional approach may open opportunities for symbolic gains. Even if U.S. institutional and domestic constraints limit outcomes, China could secure meaningful signaling victories that reinforce its strategic position and convey intent without triggering confrontation.
The interplay between these tracks amplifies China’s cumulative influence. Stabilizing North Korea reduces potential flashpoints at a sensitive time, while enhancing credibility with Washington and regional actors. Strategic restraint in the Middle East enhances China’s image as a responsible global actor, shaping expectations for U.S. behavior. Economic and trade negotiations, selectively pursued, further reinforce China’s credibility and bargaining power across diplomatic and security arenas.
Beijing is also attentive to summit optics. Beyond bilateral leverage, the meeting provides an opportunity to demonstrate domestic competence, signal patience and strategic calculation to Washington, and remind regional actors of China’s continued influence without overt aggression. Carefully staged optics can amplify even modest gains, creating secondary leverage in both regional and global calculations.
Risks and Rewards
China’s approach is not without risk. North Korea may act unpredictably, limiting Beijing’s ability to shape outcomes. U.S. volatility and domestic politics could constrain concessions. Regional skepticism – particularly from South Korea and Japan – also imposes limits on China’s maneuverability. Even amid these uncertainties, Beijing’s successive moves – from Pyongyang to the Persian Gulf to trade negotiations – are increasingly coalescing into a coherent approach, strengthening its relative position without relying on rigidly pre-scripted plans.
Xi views the upcoming meeting as an opportunity to mark progress toward both bilateral and regional stability. In a February 4 phone call with Trump, he expressed his hope that 2026 would become a year of “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation” between China and the United States. Chinese state media portrays such meetings as advancing Xi’s vision of cooperative security amid global tensions. The challenge lies in ensuring incremental moves on multiple tracks coalesce into tangible leverage rather than dissipating into fragmented diplomacy.
The summit offers multiple possible outcomes, each carrying strategic implications. A limited trade-focused agreement would provide a near-term win but leave longer-term security and strategic issues unresolved. Indeed, analysts have expressed concern that the Trump-Xi summit could default to narrow trade discussions while leaving broader security questions unresolved.
By contrast, even modest concessions on Taiwan signaling, North Korea coordination, or tariff management could yield outsized benefits if paired with Beijing’s carefully cultivated image as a stabilizing actor.
China’s incremental approach allows flexibility in real-time adjustments, enabling Beijing to respond to shifts in U.S. positioning, regional developments, or North Korean signaling. By linking discrete moves across domains, China may achieve outcomes that exceed what Washington anticipates while minimizing risks of overextension. This is particularly valuable in a context of global uncertainty, where unilateral action could provoke counterproductive reactions.
Strategic Implications Beyond the Summit
Both Washington and Beijing share an interest in a predictable bilateral relationship to address domestic and global challenges. The critical question is which side will extract greater concessions. After months of measured diplomacy and incremental groundwork – from Pyongyang to the Persian Gulf to trade negotiations – Xi Jinping appears poised to enter the talks with leverage that may exceed Washington’s expectations. The summit will test how effectively these emergent tracks translate into tangible results.
China is learning to operate in an environment where the United States remains powerful but distracted, regional actors are attentive to cues, and global expectations increasingly reward stability and predictability. Incremental coordination, adaptive signaling, and cumulative leverage may offer Beijing a durable advantage, even in the absence of headline-grabbing breakthroughs.