Data Cutoff: April 16, 2026
The China & Taiwan Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army. The update focuses on the CCP’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Toplines
Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun reiterated standard PRC rhetoric during her April 10 meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The PRC is setting conditions for continued cooperation with the KMT. The PRC’s readout for the Cheng-Xi meeting emphasized cross-strait integration, criticized “Taiwan independence” activists, and stated that the KMT and CCP would continue working together to promote cross-strait relations.[1] Taiwanese media reported that Cheng avoided directly answering whether she supported Xi’s vision of “reunification.”[2] Cheng did state that “Taiwan’s achievements and the mainland’s achievements are all achievements of the Chinese nation,” echoing PRC rhetoric on the shared “national rejuvenation” of the “Chinese nation.”[3] PRC rhetoric uses this phrasing to reference the PRC’s development and modernization, as well as the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and the PRC under ”one country, two systems.”[4] Cheng and Xi reiterated their support for the 1992 Consensus, an unofficial agreement between the KMT and CCP that states that both sides agree that there is “one China,” but disagree on whether that “China” is the PRC or the Republic of China (ROC).[5]
Cheng is the first sitting KMT chairperson to meet with Xi since then-KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-Chu in 2016.[6] Hung similarly referenced the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and emphasized cross-strait exchanges. The PRC cut off communications with Taiwan following the May 2016 election of former Democratic Progressive (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen. Former and current KMT politicians have facilitated dialogue with the CCP since then, allowing the KMT to present itself as the facilitator of cross-strait exchanges.[7]
Taiwanese officials criticized Cheng’s visit and statements. Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai critiqued Cheng’s statements that the “Taiwan Strait should never be a chessboard for interference by external forces” and her support for the PRC’s rhetoric of “national rejuvenation,” stating that the latter risked emboldening the PRC.[8] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) expressed concern that Cheng failed to mention their requested talking points, including that the PRC should cease its military aggression against Taiwan.[9] Cheng said that she discussed Taiwan’s participation in international organizations with Xi and that he “welcomed it and responded very positively.”[10] The PRC has consistently worked to prevent Taiwan’s participation in international organizations as a separate entity, advocating instead for organizations to recognize “one China” under the PRC.
The PRC is continuing its multi-domain coercion efforts targeting Taiwan as a means to achieve “peaceful reunification.” The PRC released a ten-point plan to increase cross-strait integration, particularly with Taiwan’s offshore islands Kinmen and Matsu, following the Xi-Cheng meeting.[11] The measures proposed establishing infrastructure ties between Kinmen and Matsu and the PRC’s Fujian province, the closest province to Taiwan, and allowing direct flights between Taiwan and certain cities in the PRC.[12] The PRC has targeted Kinmen in numerous acts of coercion, including aerial and maritime incursions meant to erode the islands’ threat awareness.[13] The PRC may be working to increase economic links between the PRC and Taiwan’s offshore islands to spread the notion that cross-strait cooperation is economically beneficial for Taiwan and thus improve Taiwanese public sentiment towards cross-strait integration. Kinmen and Matsu have closer economic and political ties to the PRC than the main island of Taiwan due to their proximity to PRC territory, which the PRC may assess as making them more amenable to economic integration efforts. Taiwanese scholars expressed concerns that the PRC’s proposed infrastructure initiatives could increase Taiwan’s economic dependence on the PRC or foment internal divisions in Taiwan.[14]
The ten measures likely represent the PRC’s effort to show support for the KMT prior to the November 2026 Taiwanese local elections by linking Cheng’s visit to potential economic gains for Taiwan. The PRC staged live-fire drills in the Yellow Sea during Cheng’s visit.[15] Unnamed Taiwanese security officials said that the PRC deployed approximately one hundred coast guard and naval vessels throughout the East and South China Seas near the time of Cheng’s visit, up from the usual levels of fifty to sixty vessels.[16] The PRC may have intended these actions to represent its views towards the two respective parties in, presenting the KMT as the party for cross-strait peace and blaming the DPP for cross-strait tensions following the Cheng-Xi meeting.[17]
The PRC likely aided Iran’s targeting capabilities during its conflict with the United States and Israel and may be assisting Iran’s efforts to reconstitute some of its air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is likely interested in maintaining the stability of the Iranian regime without provoking US retaliation or jeopardizing its relationship with other Gulf states. CNN cited three unnamed sources familiar with US intelligence assessments on April 11 who claimed that the PRC is preparing to provide Iran with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that it will aim to route through third parties to disguise their true origin.[18] MANPADS are shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile systems that pose a threat to low-flying fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.[19] MANPADS alone will not fully reconstitute Iran’s degraded air defense capability, but could allow it to bolster its air defenses around key areas, such as its naval assets and energy infrastructure.[20] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied the report and stated that the PRC would retaliate if the United States used the report as a pretext to impose tariffs on the PRC.[21]
Financial Times reported on April 14 that Iran used a PRC-launched satellite that it purchased from PRC satellite company Earth Eye Co in September 2024 to target US military infrastructure in the region.[22] The Financial Times investigation showed that the satellite captured images of the United States’ Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on March 13, 14, and 15. Iran struck the base on March 14, damaging five US aircraft.[23] PRC commercial satellite company Empostat provided Iran access to ground stations ensuring Iran’s access to the satellite could not be interdicted through strikes on Iranian ground installations.[24] Empostat has close ties to the PLA’s Aerospace Force, according to the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on China.[25] High resolution satellite imagery of US military assets in the Middle East likely aided Iran’s strike campaign during the conflict.
ISW-CDOT has assessed that the PRC has a strategic interest in the stability of Iran’s regime and the outcome of the present conflict with the United States and Israel.[26] The PRC is reluctant to provide large-scale support to Iran, however, in order to avoid US retaliation and undermining its close economic ties with other Gulf states.[27] PRC Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang on April 9 denied accusations that the PRC is providing chip manufacturing equipment to Iran’s military.[28] US President Donald Trump on April 12 said that the PRC would face a 50 percent tariff if it supplied military equipment to Iran.[29] Fear of retaliation has likely led the PRC to seek limited means of support for Iran to achieve its diverging objectives. The PRC’s continued material support for Iran’s warfighting capabilities, despite their limited nature, contradicts the PRC’s attempt to frame itself as a neutral mediator interested in securing peace.[30]
The PRC has likely practiced clandestine insertions into Taiwanese territory using motorboats and other small craft to avoid detection during PLA exercises. The PRC could use these methods to insert special forces, saboteurs, or civilians that encourage capitulation and undermine Taiwan’s defenses during a conflict. The Taiwanese NSB briefed the LY on an unreleased report on April 13 regarding illegal entries of PRC nationals into Taiwan during PLA military activity.[31] Taiwanese media reported on the same day that the briefing showed that PRC nationals have used unpowered small craft to approach Taiwan’s outlying islands undetected and used small motorboats to reach the main island, particularly during increased PLA military activity around Taiwan.[32] The NSB report stated that PRC efforts to reach the main island with these methods focused on Miaoli County, Taoyuan, and New Taipei City’s Linkou and Tamsui districts.[33] The report further noted that PRC nationals could use the small craft to disembark anywhere on Taiwan’s mostly rocky coastline, further complicating detection.[34] ISW-CDOT previously reported that the PRC may have smuggled an automatic identification system (AIS) transponder into Tamsui Fisherman’s Wharf and that PRC nationals have attempted to swim to Kinmen from the PRC as a low-cost, deniable means of eroding Taiwan’s control over Kinmen and its surrounding waters.[35]
These incursions coinciding with PLA military activity suggest the PRC may be testing the clandestine insertion of PRC operatives. PLA doctrine on a joint island landing campaign calls for the advanced insertion of special operating forces (SOF) to conduct reconnaissance, guide precision strikes, conduct decapitation strikes, and paralyze the enemy’s command system.[36] PLA SOF doctrine views SOF’s main role as battlefield preparation in advance of a conventional force.[37] The PLA’s principle formations that would most likely be involved in a Taiwan invasion each contain a SOF brigade.[38] The PLA may be experimenting with methods to insert SOF forces into Taiwan undetected to support an amphibious landing or precision strike campaign on the island. The PRC alternatively could be inserting operatives into Taiwan to undermine Taiwanese morale and will to resist the PRC through sabotage or information operations among Taiwan’s population.
The areas of Taiwan that the PRC has attempted to infiltrate in this manner could be critical to an amphibious invasion. New Taipei City’s Linkou and Tamsui districts are adjacent to Bali Beach and Tamsui Beach, two of Taiwan’s “red beaches” that have favorable conditions for an amphibious landing.[39] Taoyuan is the nearest urban center to Zhuwei beach, another possible amphibious landing location.[40] Miaoli County does not contain any red beaches, but the PLA would likely need to transit through Miaoli to allow forces that land around Taichung in central Taiwan to link up with landings in northern Taiwan, should the PLA land in those places.[41] Infiltrating these areas could improve the PLA’s understanding of local terrain, human geography, and military installations, which are critical to planning and executing an amphibious landing.
Key Takeaways
- KMT-CCP Dialogue: KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and delivered statements that repeated standard PRC rhetoric about the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and opposing “Taiwan independence.” The PRC released a ten-point plan to increase cross-strait integration with a particular focus on Taiwan’s offshore islands.
- PRC-Iran Relations: The PRC likely aided Iranian targeting capabilities and may be assisting Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its air defenses. The PRC is likely acting to maintain the stability of the Iranian regime but is unlikely to engage significantly in the conflict to prevent provoking a US response and angering the Gulf States.
- PLA Activity in Taiwan: The PRC has likely practiced clandestine insertions into Taiwanese territory during PLA exercises. The PRC could use these methods to insert special forces, saboteurs, or civilians to undermine Taiwanese defenses during an invasion scenario.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwanese National Security Bureau (NSB) Director-General Tsai Ming-yen stated that PRC espionage operations in Taiwan have increasingly targeted noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel. The PRC is likely exploiting financial insecurity among lower-ranking soldiers to obtain sensitive defense information and discredit the Taiwanese military. Tsai stated that the PRC has closely integrated its national security, intelligence, and United Front efforts to expand its espionage networks inside Taiwan.[42] Tsai stated that recent PRC espionage operations have targeted an increased number of lower-ranking Taiwanese military personnel for recruitment.[43]
PRC intelligence agents commonly use financial incentives to entice financially insecure military personnel to commit espionage.[44] PRC intelligence officers often approach Taiwanese noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers online, promising loans, payment for interviews, or seemingly lucrative business opportunities before eventually requesting classified military information.[45]
The PRC is likely attempting to take advantage of the relatively low cost of recruiting large numbers of lower-paid enlisted troops and junior officers to spy on Taiwan, rather than investing heavily in recruiting higher-ranking officers. PRC intelligence agents often request military personnel information and duty rosters from Taiwanese sources they have recruited, likely for use in identifying more potential recruits.[46] Taiwanese authorities indicted former TV producer and retired Taiwanese Air Force serviceman Lee Neng-chien on April 10 for organizing a spy ring and passing personal data on military and intelligence personnel to PRC intelligence agents.[47] Lee also attempted to recruit multiple active-duty members of Taiwan’s military for espionage before Taiwanese authorities detained him in December 2025.[48]
PRC intelligence agents have ordered Taiwanese military personnel they have recruited to film videos or sign written pledges stating that they are loyal to the PRC and will surrender to the PLA in an invasion.[49] This supports the PRC’s psychological warfare efforts to erode Taiwan’s confidence in its military.
Recent PRC espionage operations outside Taiwan have similarly targeted junior personnel working in lower-paying positions in the United States, the Philippines, and various NATO member state militaries, offering financial incentives for passing sensitive military information to the PRC.[50] The PRC likely views this as an effective method of expanding its espionage networks and acquiring foreign military secrets and will continue to target financially insecure junior military personnel in the future.
Partisan gridlock is still preventing Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) from passing some form of the special defense bill as international pressure mounts. US Senator Jim Banks visited Taipei to meet with senior government officials on April 8, urging the LY to “do its part and pass the special budget.”[51] Banks also expressed hope for the outcome of the April 9 caucus negotiations for the bill, but the KMT proceeded to boycott the meeting.[52] The KMT instead submitted a supplementary resolution that at least 15 KMT legislators signed, which would require each large-sum military purchase to be individually approved.[53] Multiple DPP officials noted that the KMT’s boycott happened during KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s PRC visit.[54] Legislators met on April 15 to discuss the special defense budget and passed an agreement that Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai would present a report on the budget on April 21.[55] Taiwan’s finance minister and government budget chief will also attend and take questions after Cho’s presentation.[56] The LY will forward the bills for committee review afterwards. Taiwanese Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu noted that the two main points of contention within the LY are concerning procurement projects and funding.[57]
China
PLA Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier Fujian may begin conducting deployments beyond the first island chain in 2026 to take steps toward achieving full operational capability (FOC), although it is unlikely to reach FOC within a year of commissioning. The PLAN likely aims to achieve FOC for Fujian as quickly as possible to ensure it can effectively participate in military operations in the near future. PRC state broadcasting service CCTV released a video on April 12 describing Fujian’s “new combat capability” since it was commissioned in November 2025.[58] CCTV pointed to PLAN aircraft carrier Shandong’s first deployment to the Western Pacific in 2023 as a key milestone in developing its “far-seas” capability, suggesting a similar deployment for Fujian was forthcoming.[59] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times published a commentary on Fujian on April 12 that claimed it will achieve “full combat capability” in 2026.[60] The Global Times article stated that Fujian first had to receive a full complement of carrier aircraft and practice deploying with a carrier strike group before it undertook a mission beyond the first island chain.[61] Global Times’ assertion that Fujian will reach full combat capability before the end of 2026 and CCTV’s coverage of Shandong’s first far-seas deployment suggests Fujian may conduct a similar deployment before the end of 2026.
The United States military distinguishes between initial operational capability (IOC) and FOC to signify differing levels of readiness for combat operations.[62] IOC indicates that a unit or vessel has received all requisite systems to operate effectively, while FOC indicates that a unit or vessel has achieved a high level of proficiency at operating and maintaining its systems.[63] Global Times’ suggestion that Fujian has not yet received its full carrier wing indicates that Fujian may not have reached even IOC by US standards.[64] Major US Navy surface combatants can take several years after commissioning to reach FOC due to the complexity of modern naval systems and operations, and Fujian will likely struggle to reach US-defined standards for IOC and FOC within the same calendar year.[65]
The PRC’s assertion that Fujian will reach full readiness by the end of 2026 could suggest that the PLAN is willing to deploy vessels at lower standards of readiness to make up for its existing shortcomings, particularly in carrier operations. The PLAN operates two aircraft carriers beside Fujian, both of which are limited in their launching mechanism, carrying capacity, and operating range.[66] Fujian was designed to improve on these shortcomings in the PLAN’s carrier fleet.[67] Global Times suggested Fujian will play a key role in “achieving reunification” by defending “sea lanes and oil routes” far from the PRC’s internal waters.[68] The current conflict in the Middle East may have highlighted the fragility of the PRC’s supply lines and the PLAN’s inability to secure them due to a lack of long-range power projection assets. The PLAN may seek to accelerate the process of bringing Fujian to FOC and could accept a lower standard of combat readiness before deploying Fujian as a result. This could limit Fujian’s effectiveness in wartime if it deploys for combat operations without the requisite experience in conducting a high pace of operations under fire and maintaining the vessel’s complex systems under heavy strain.
The PRC dismissed Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong with no explanation. The PRC’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced Sun’s removal on April 14 in a brief statement that also included other personnel changes.[69] Sun is no longer listed on the foreign ministry’s website.[70] PRC sources did not give any reason for his removal or specify whether he was moving to a new job. Sun spent his diplomatic career focused on South and Southeast Asia, including serving as the PRC’s ambassador to Pakistan from 2013-2017 and to India from 2019-2022.[71] Sun’s last public appearances were a series of meetings with ambassadors from Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Pakistan from March 9 to 14.[72] It is unclear whether Sun participated in PRC-Pakistan discussions that produced the joint PRC-Pakistan peace plan for the Iran War.[73]
Northeast Asia
Japan
Japan is continuing to strengthen its defenses despite PRC rhetoric and economic coercion. Japan joined the Philippines’ annual Salaknib defense exercises, deploying approximately 420 Ground Self-Defense Force personnel to the Philippines in the first such deployment since World War II.[74] Japan will reportedly send approximately 1000 troops to participate in the annual US-Philippine combined Balikatan exercises later in April.[75] Japan has participated in Balikatan as an observer since 2012.[76]
Japan’s participation in exercises with the Philippines comes amid Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) efforts to amend Japan’s constitution. These amendments would include revisions to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi alluded to the proposed amendment during the LDP’s convention on April 12, stating that she hoped to come to next year’s convention with a plan to formally proceed with the amendment.[77] Japanese lawmaker Keiji Furuya was appointed to lead a commission on constitutional revision.[78] The PRC sanctioned Furuya on March 30 as part of its ongoing diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against Japan following Takaichi’s November 2025 statement on potential Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency.[79]
Japan’s efforts to strengthen its defenses and regional partnerships reflect its ongoing resistance to the PRC’s pressure campaign. The PRC has consistently criticized Japanese defense modernization efforts, including the intended placement of missiles on Japan’s Yonaguni Island, as militaristic.[80] PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated comments criticizing Takaichi during an April 10 press conference, blaming Takaichi’s comments for current PRC-Japan tensions.[81]
North Korea
Nothing Significant to Report.
South Korea
Nothing Significant To Report.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC may be conducting new lines of effort to reduce Philippine access to disputed South China Sea features. The Philippines National Security Council (NSC) on April 13 accused PRC fishermen of dumping cyanide into the waters around Second Thomas Shoal.[82] NSC assistant director-general Cornelio Valencia stated that the cyanide was used to kill local fish populations, thus removing a source of food for Philippine personnel stationed aboard the BRP Sierra Madre.[83] Valencia stated that the cyanide could also negatively impact the health of sailors and damage the coral reefs that support the Sierra Madre’s structural foundation. The BRP Sierra Madre is a Philippine Navy (PN) vessel intentionally run aground in 1999 in the Second Thomas Shoal to serve as an outpost and maintain Philippine territorial claims. PN spokesperson Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad stated the PN troops seized multiple bottles, later confirmed to contain cyanide, from PRC fishing vessels in February, July, and October 2025, and most recently in March 2026.[84] The PRC denied Philippine accusations, but the Philippines has ordered the PN and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to increase patrols in the area. The PRC attacked PN boats near Second Thomas Shoal in June 2024 and has repeatedly attempted to block Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre.[85] PRC cyanide dumping may represent a new line of effort to make the Sierra Madre unusable as an outpost, thus removing a permanent Philippine presence from the Spratly Islands.
Reuters reported on April 15 that satellite imagery taken on April 10 and 11 showed four PRC fishing boats, a PLAN or China Coast Guard (CCG) ship, and a floating barrier blocking the entrance to Scarborough Shoal.[86] PCG Spokesperson Jay Tarriela told Reuters on April 15 that the PRC had installed a 1,150-foot floating barrier at the entrance of Scarborough Shoal on April 10 and 11 and had since removed the barrier from the shoal entrance. The PRC has deployed floating barriers at Scarborough Shoal multiple times, most recently in October 2025.[87] Scarborough Shoal is a disputed feature in the South China Sea claimed by the PRC, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The PRC has maintained de facto control of the feature since a 2012 dispute. The PRC established a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal on September 10, likely to strengthen PRC territorial claims and justify keeping Philippine sailors out of the region.[88] The floating barriers are yet another way for the PRC to prevent Philippine sailors from operating in the disputed territory.
Indonesia recovered a PRC unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in its territorial waters near the Lombok Strait on April 6. The PRC is likely deploying UUVs and research vessels to survey strategically important waters and improve the PLA’s ability to operate submarines and conduct anti-submarine warfare beyond the first island chain. The UUV measured approximately 12 feet long and was reportedly equipped with an array of underwater survey equipment and sensors.[89] The UUV also featured the name and logo of the PRC state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation’s 710 Research Institute, which has links to the PLA and produces most of its underwater naval mines.[90]
Indonesian fishermen discovered the UUV near the Lombok Strait, a strategically important waterway located between Indonesia’s Bali and Lombok islands.[91] The Lombok Strait is deep enough to allow passage by submarines, large naval surface vessels, and “supertanker” cargo ships, and it is a potential alternative to the Strait of Malacca for shipping and maritime access between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.[92] Indonesia previously discovered PRC UUVs operating near key waterways inside its territorial waters in 2019 and 2020.[93] The Philippines also identified several PRC UUVs operating inside its territorial waters and at the Luzon Strait, another key waterway at the boundary of the first island chain, between 2022 and 2025.[94]
The PRC is likely mapping and surveying key waterways to improve the PLAN’s ability to deploy submarines outside of the first island chain. The PRC deployed dozens of research vessels to map and survey waters between the first and second island chains from 2020 to 2025, especially around the US territory of Guam.[95] The PRC has historically viewed the first island chain as a strategic barrier imposed by the United States to contain the PLAN.[96] The PLAN also likely intends to use the data gathered by these drones and research vessels to anticipate and track the movements of US and allied submarines transiting these strategic waterways, and to prevent them from entering the Western Pacific in the event of a Taiwan contingency.[97]
Latin America
The PRC is continuing to escalate its pressure campaign following Panama’s seizure of two Panama Canal ports. CK Hutchison subsidiary Panama Ports Company (PPC) filed arbitration proceedings in London against Danish logistics firm Maersk on April 8.[98] PPC accused the company of colluding with Panama to take over its port operations in the Panama Canal. PPC alleges that Maersk undermined its contractual rights over the Cristobal and Balboa terminals by facilitating a transition to new operators. Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, in response to rising tensions, stated that Panama was “not interested” in a prolonged confrontation with the PRC and expressed hope that relations would de-escalate.[99] Financial Times reported that the PRC’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) met with Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company in March to demand they withdraw from the Balboa and Cristobal ports, indicating direct PRC pressure on firms involved in the transition.[100]
This arbitration reflects broader patterns of PRC-linked entities leveraging economic and legal mechanisms to contest unfavorable outcomes and exert influence in strategic sectors. Panama’s ports sit on one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. PRC presence there resulted in US security concerns due to the waterway’s central role in global trade and the negative impacts on global trade that would arise if the PRC sought to exert control over the canal.
Endnotes:
[1] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202604/content_7065151.htm
[2] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202604100022
[3] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202604100022
[4] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_674919/2159_674923/200011/t20001107_7950011.shtml
[5] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202604/content_7065151.htm
[6] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3349597/xi-jinping-meets-taiwan-opposition-leader-cheng-li-wun-beijing
[7] https://interpret.csis.org/translations/general-secretary-xi-jinping-meets-with-kuomintang-chairperson-hung-hsiu-chu/
[8] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/12/2003855457
[9] https://udn dot com/news/story/124802/9434613?from=udn-catelistnews_ch2
[10] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202604100022
[11] https://www.news dot cn/tw/20260415/cc6a116809304a7b92f643de230bfcb4/c.html
[12] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202604120005
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/exploring-a-prc-short-of-war-coercion-campaign-to-seize-taiwans-kinmen-islands-and-possible-responses-2/
[14] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202604130024
[15] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/09/2003855311
[16] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/11/2003855414
[17] https://www.news dot cn/tw/20260415/cc6a116809304a7b92f643de230bfcb4/c.html
[18] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/11/politics/us-intelligence-iran-china-weapons
[19] https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c62623.htm
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-11-2026/
[21] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202604/t20260414_11891610.shtml
[22] https://www.ft.com/content/1fddd2cd-1294-4e9c-a17d-5ea06b399355?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[23] https://www.ft.com/content/1fddd2cd-1294-4e9c-a17d-5ea06b399355?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[24] https://www.ft.com/content/1fddd2cd-1294-4e9c-a17d-5ea06b399355?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[25] https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/pulling-latin-america-into-china-s-orbit-final-compressed-1.pdf
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-april-10-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-april-10-2026/
[28] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16454112.html
[29] https://www.newsweek.com/trump-china-iran-weapons-50-percent-tariff-warning-11817592
[30] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/wjbzhd/202603/t20260331_11884511.html
[31] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/12/2003855459
[32] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/12/2003855459
[33] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/12/2003855459
[34] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/04/12/2003855459
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-november-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-february-23-2026/
[36] https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=cmsi-red-books; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2421219/in-their-own-words-plas-science-of-campaigns/; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy/
[37] https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=cmsi-red-books
[38] https://jamestown.org/snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/
[39] https://www.newsweek.com/taiwan-beaches-higher-risk-invasion-china-1851899; https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/01/26/taiwan-Taiwan-red-beaches-China-amphibious-invasion/4811706285822/; https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jan/24/lightly-defended-beach-highlights-questions-over-t/
[40] https://www.newsweek.com/taiwan-beaches-higher-risk-invasion-china-1851899
[41] https://www.newsweek.com/taiwan-beaches-higher-risk-invasion-china-1851899
[42] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6336492
[43] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6336492; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2026/04/09/2003855278
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