The Strait of Hormuz isn’t China’s only chokepoint. The Strait of Malacca may be more strategically vital — and on June 12, Beijing arrested an American scholar to protect its access to it.
Min Zin, a scholar of China-Myanmar relations and US citizen, was wrongfully detained in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province and the inland terminus of the oil pipeline China built specifically to bypass the Malacca Strait.
He is not — as China claims — a spy. His arrest was politically motivated, meant to induce Myanmar’s military government to protect that pipeline from an advancing militia.
China imports roughly 80% of its oil through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway in Southeast Asia that the US Navy can, in a crisis, threaten to close. To overcome this chokepoint, China built a massive pipeline that meets the sea in Myanmar at Kyaukphyu — also the site of a planned deep-sea port, a trans-Myanmar rail line, and a special economic zone under the Belt and Road, backed by billions of dollars in Chinese investment.
Lose Kyaukphyu, and Beijing loses both its energy chokepoint workaround and its most important Indian Ocean foothold. And that doomsday scenario might be playing out in real time.
The rebel Arakan Army had, as of mid-June, advanced to within five kilometers of Kyaukphyu, seizing key positions that connect the nearby town to the Myanmar naval base protecting the pipeline.
The Arakan Army is not just another insurgent militia in Myanmar. It is one of the most militarily capable ethnic armed organizations in the country. It has carved out a de facto state across much of western Myanmar — complete with its own courts, taxation system and even a newly launched state lottery.
Chinese drone operators and contractors have reportedly joined the junta’s fight against the Arakan Army. Beijing almost certainly wants the junta to continue moving infantry, drones and fighter jets from central Myanmar — a theater more consequential for the junta’s own survival — to Kyaukphyu.
To keep the junta cooperative, Beijing needed to offer something aside from military support. Enter Min Zin — a student activist in Myanmar’s 1988 pro-democracy crackdown and the founder of a well-respected independent think tank. He was in China at the invitation of a Chinese academic institution.
Beijing confirmed Min Zin’s arrest on June 12 — the same day it announced that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing would arrive for a state visit on June 16. The arrest itself reportedly happened on June 3. Beijing sat on it for nearly two weeks, then released the news alongside the visit announcement.
Min Zin became Beijing’s offering to Naypyidaw — a public demonstration of loyalty delivered just before the summit. That Beijing absorbed the diplomatic cost of seizing an American citizen so soon after President Donald Trump’s meeting with President Xi Jinping in Beijing speaks volumes.
In a world newly obsessed with shipping chokepoints — where the Strait of Hormuz has proven easier to shut down than to reopen — Beijing will use anything or anyone as a bargaining chip to keep its supply chains open. Americans working or traveling in China should take note.
The other story, however, is about the Myanmar-China relationship. The conventional view is that Myanmar is a Chinese vassal — Beijing pulls the strings and Naypyidaw follows.
Kyaukphyu shows that China needs Myanmar as well. Min Zin’s arrest highlights that Beijing is not managing Myanmar from a position of strength. It is scrambling to influence an incompetent and unpopular regime to protect its chokepoints.
Washington should demand Min Zin’s immediate release. The US cannot stand by while the Chinese government takes Americans hostage to placate Myanmar’s brutal military dictatorship, which seized power in a 2021 democracy-suspending coup.
The motivations behind Min Zin’s arrest should also remind American policymakers that supporting Myanmar’s pro-democracy and ethnic resistance forces is not charity — a democratic Myanmar that can chart its own course is in America’s interests.
Daniel Swift is a senior research analyst for the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is also a retired US diplomat who served in Myanmar from 2015 to 2019.