China is expanding its economic and infrastructure footprint in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine through a series of indirect and largely unpublicized initiatives.
In the Donbas, around 80 bank branches have begun trading in cash yuan. This cooperation includes the exchange of local delegations and efforts toward “import substitution,” all while Beijing officially maintains a policy of not recognizing the occupation of Crimea or the annexed regions, according to the Insider on April 23.
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Chinese engagement in the region predates Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In late 2013, the Ukrainian government signed a memorandum with a private Chinese firm to build a deep-water port in Crimea and reconstruct a port in Sevastopol.
While the project was intended to turn the peninsula into a hub for the “Maritime Silk Road,” the 2014 annexation and subsequent international sanctions initially halted these plans. By June 2014, the Chinese company announced it was no longer pursuing projects in Crimea.
However, the dynamic changed after 2022 as Moscow and Beijing strengthened their ties. Reports emerged in 2023 regarding secret discussions to build a transport tunnel under the Kerch Strait following Ukrainian attacks on the existing bridge.
By 2025, Ukrainian intelligence noted attempts to attract Chinese investment for the Kerch seaport and military infrastructure at Lake Donuzlav. Observers have noted Chinese-owned vessels entering Sevastopol with their transponders turned off, leading to formal protests from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The expansion is also visible in the industrial sector of the Donbas. In 2022, occupation authorities in the Donetsk region revived the abandoned Karan quarry. By late 2023, the quarry signed cooperation agreements with two Chinese companies for rock-crushing and sorting equipment.
Local residents now refer to the site as the “Chinese quarry.” The stone extracted there is used for construction across the occupied territories, including the “Novorossiya” highway connecting Rostov to Crimea.
Experts suggest that while large state-owned Chinese corporations avoid the region to escape secondary sanctions, medium-sized private businesses often act as pioneers. These firms provide mining equipment to profitable coal mines in the Luhansk region and supply heavy trucks to the area.
Investigations indicate that these business links are often facilitated by intermediaries, such as Chinese students or community leaders based in Russia who maintain ties with manufacturers in China.
This presence extends into the political and cultural spheres. In 2023, Chinese singer Wang Fang performed the song “Katyusha ” at the ruins of the Mariupol Drama Theater, an act that drew sharp condemnation from Ukraine.
Meanwhile, local propaganda media staff from occupied regions have been invited to China for tours of drone production facilities. Occupation officials also frequently attend business forums in Chinese cities like Harbin to seek partners for “rebuilding” the Donbas.
For Beijing, these moves may serve a broader geopolitical strategy. Beyond immediate economic gains, the region offers access to strategic resources. Roughly half of Ukraine’s rare-earth mineral deposits, including lithium, titanium, and zirconium, are currently located in occupied zones.
As Russia remains focused on its military efforts and lacks the technology for advanced extraction, Chinese developers may eventually secure control over these critical assets as part of a long-term logistics corridor into Eastern Europe.
In February 2026, analysts from the Independent Anti-corruption Commission (NAKO) reported that Russia had evolved from merely surviving sanctions to using them as a tool for deepening strategic alliances with China, Iran, and North Korea.
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