Mid-July should have been a moment of quiet satisfaction in Beijing. Fresh data showed China’s favourability surpassing that of the United States in 25 of 37 nations surveyed by Pew Research Centre, including key European countries. Domestically, the second-quarter gross domestic product growth of 4.3 per cent, while softer than the first financial quarter, kept the annual target within reach.
The logic was simple: with the US distracted by Donald Trump’s erratic trade wars and isolationist rhetoric, Beijing could court a more autonomous European Union, stabilise its two largest export markets and project an image of reliable global leadership.
Instead, events this month delivered a stark reminder that the West’s fractures are less deep than Beijing hoped. On July 13, the European Union’s 27 foreign ministers quietly adopted a strategy paper marking a qualitative shift in Brussels’ posture. Drafted by the EU’s External Action Service, the document casts China and Russia as the two principal revisionist powers seeking to “reshape the global order”. The label moves Beijing out of the “partner-competitor-rival” triad and into a category Brussels once essentially reserved for Moscow.
The disconnect between Beijing’s expectations and Western realities is striking. Since late 2025, Beijing has rolled out the red carpet for a string of leaders of US allied countries, from Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to French President Emmanuel Macron, betting transatlantic fissures could be pried open.
January alone saw then UK prime minister Keir Starmer become the first British head of government in eight years to be received by Beijing, as well as the visit of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who swapped canola levy reductions for a removal of electric vehicle (EV) tariffs. The playbook: bank visits from America’s closest allies, wedge transatlantic ties and pitch Beijing as stable alternative to chaotic Washington.
Compounding this, Trump accused China of orchestrating “the largest compromise of election data in history” last week, a claim Beijing blasted as “unfounded smears”. An intelligence community assessment released in 2021 said there was no evidence China had interfered with the technical conduct of the 2020 election. However, the recently released records show debate within the community over whether Beijing’s data-gathering constituted influence operations.