Since the United States and Israel went to war against Iran, every country on Earth has incurred the consequences.
China, for instance, has condemned the United States and Israel’s actions. Russia, meanwhile, is providing intelligence and logistical support to Iran. Nations of the Global South have rushed to condemn Israel, while US allies such as the United Kingdom are reluctantly drawn into fighting.
One regional power, Pakistan, is mediating the conflict to ensure safe transit through the Strait of Hormuz and prevent the outbreak of further hostilities.
Against this backdrop, India—a rising power and leader of the Global South—has been noticeably mute. As of writing, the Indian position on the war has been advocating a ceasefire between the belligerents and calling for dialogue, without expressing any other views. This position is controversial for India, both at home and abroad.
Domestically, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government is being criticized for not condemning the United States and Israel, particularly from India’s 200 million-strong Muslim community and parties of the Left.
The Indian National Congress (INC), the BJP’s chief rival party, has attacked them for failing to support Iran. Politically, it’s a swipe at the BJP’s small, if significant, Muslim constituency, composed primarily of Shia Muslims. Iran is the largest Shia country in the world, led by Shia clerics, a fact that breeds sympathy in India for the Islamic Republic.
“The INC extends its deepest condolences to the Supreme Leader’s family, to the people of Iran, and the Shia community around the world in this moment of profound grief,” wrote Mallikarjun Kharge, the INC’s president, after Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed during the war. “We stand in solidarity with them.”
Abroad, India’s reputation has been affected by its silence. Despite its good relations with Iran, Israel, and the United States, India did not seek to mediate the conflict. Instead, Pakistan—India’s chief rival—obtained the place in the spotlight, despite its open hostility to Israel.
Pakistan’s efforts appear to have prevented the outbreak of a wider war on April 7, when US President Donald Trump set a deadline for opening the Strait of Hormuz, failing which the United States would bomb Iran’s civilian infrastructure.
“Based on conversations with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, of Pakistan…I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks. This will be a double-sided CEASEFIRE!” Trump wrote on TruthSocial.
This fact has caused India embarrassment, prompting acrimony by Indian leaders.
“I feel so sorry to say this, but Pakistan is faring much better diplomatically than India, which has never happened in the past 70 years. I believe we are on our way down,” said Shashi Tharoor, a member of the Indian Parliament and chairman of its Standing Committee on External Affairs.
The BJP government has defended its actions, claiming that India is not a “middleman.” This defense has only invited more criticism.
At home and abroad, the consensus is that India has fumbled the moment by staying away from the conflict. Amid this sentiment, it’s worth examining the reasons for India’s posture, which extends from its energy security needs and sensitive bilateral relations with all three major belligerents.
The Iran War Threatens India’s Energy Security
India needs oil. The country imports 80 percent of its petroleum, at nearly 5 million barrels per day. Oil imports are essential to its economy—to fuel transportation, produce fertilizer for agriculture, and support 1.5 billion people. There is no alternative to oil for India. Its coal, nuclear, and natural gas cannot make up for it.
Energy security, therefore, has been a large factor in India’s bilateral relationships with US rivals. For example, Russia has been selling crude oil at a premium price to India during its war against Ukraine. Russia prizes Indian and Chinese oil revenues as the West reduces its oil demand. The increases have been dramatic: since 2020, Russia’s share of India’s oil imports has risen from 2 percent to nearly 40 percent.
Insofar as the war in Iran goes, the biggest global economic shock has been the rise in energy prices due to insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz. The global price of oil during the war has exceeded $100 per barrel, with monthly increases of over 50 percent, costing importers dearly. Neighboring countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, have closed schools and ordered fuel rationing.
Like them, India is affected. The longer the war lasts, the more costly it is for India in terms of energy. It is already paying over $2 billion more per month for oil imports, and some Indian economists estimate the surcharge could rise to $7–8 billion per month.
Foreign exchange reserves are of great importance to India, primarily for purchasing oil. India’s reserves declined by $30 billion in one month during March. A greater drain on these reserves —due to higher oil prices and lower trade volumes—could push India’s economy into a balance-of-payments crisis.
This would be bad on its own terms, but even worse for the BJP politically as it prepares for a major state election in Uttar Pradesh in 2027, where the economy is always the biggest issue.
Iran offers India a way out of this problem. It is a major oil exporter, and its proximity to India across the Arabian Sea makes it a prime seller of crude to India’s west coast refineries. Historically, good relations between Iran and India have involved oil sales. In 2013, Iran even agreed to accept payments in Indian rupees, departing from its usual use of Chinese Yuan and cryptocurrency to escape US dollar sanctions.
That changed in 2019, when India—under threat of sanctions from the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran—stopped buying Iranian crude in favor of Gulf countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The war has changed India’s calculus. Gulf oil isn’t flowing through the Strait, whose commercial ship traffic has declined by 95 percent due to the war. Iran’s military and proxies are contesting control of the strait with the US Navy.
Hence, India has decided to start purchasing Iranian oil. This month, a tanker carrying 600,000 barrels of oil from Iran will dock in India, the first shipment in over seven years. India is taking advantage of a US sanctions waiver on Iranian crude oil loaded before March 20. Additionally, India is accepting shipments of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from Iran.
It is unknown whether India will receive more waiver-compliant oil. If it purchases Iranian oil in defiance of US sanctions, it will likely elicit rebukes from Israel and the United States. So far, amidst the waiver, no rebukes have been made.
For oil, therefore, India cannot afford to alienate Iran during this conflict. It needs oil for its energy security, which inevitably must pass through the Strait of Hormuz with Iranian consent. Similarly, Iran needs revenue from oil exports to survive amid this war.
Iran has responded favorably, indicating that Indian ships can transit the Strait: “Our Indian friends are in safe hands, no worries,” its embassy in India wrote on X.
At a minimum, India’s oil dependency precludes it from compromising its relationship with Iran through involvement, including in mediation. India has reasoned that it’s preferable to do and say nothing, thereby risking nothing, to keep oil flowing.
India Wants to Maintain Ties with Iran, Israel, and the US
Beyond energy security, India’s bilateral relationships are heavily implicated by the war. It is perhaps the only country in the world that has good relations with all three belligerents: Iran, Israel, and the United States. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made state visits to all three countries, most recently to Israel, days before the war began.
India’s close relationship with each nation, along with its perceived leadership as a “rising power” in international affairs, would make it a prime candidate for mediation. Presumably, India could have brought all three countries to the negotiating table to achieve a ceasefire. Prime Minister Modi might have been hailed as a peacemaker and global statesman.
Yet, India abstained. In doing so, India chose to protect its equities in each relationship, rather than enter the controversy and risk upsetting any party.
Iran is not only a key energy source for India but also a general partner. The country is a member of the BRICS forum, an alternative grouping of non-Western countries, of which India is this year’s chair. Iran and India have also supported each other politically, including in votes at the United Nations.
India has also invested heavily in Iran, most notably in the port of Chabahar. It is Iran’s only seaport, east of the Strait of Hormuz—making it critical during the war—and is operated by India on Iran’s behalf. Much of India’s trade with Central Asia flows between Chabahar and western Indian ports. If India were to lose its role in Chabahar, it would hurt its trade interests.
Israel and India have similarly developed close ties. They arise, in large part, from shared anxiety over Pakistan, which does not recognize Israel and is hostile toward it over the question of Palestine. Among Israel’s rivals, Pakistan is the only country with nuclear weapons, prompting coordination with India to check the country. India, hence, is Israel’s largest client for military equipment sales.
Among India’s Hindu nationalists, moreover, Israel has gained a positive reputation as a purported bulwark against radical Islamism. Hence, Zionism is popular among Hindu nationalist supporters of the BJP, and neglecting Israel in favor of allegedly “Muslim” interests may upset Modi’s hardline base.
The United States, meanwhile, is India’s largest export market, with which trade deal negotiations are underway. The United States is also a critical partner for India in checking its other geopolitical rival, China. America has sought proximity to India for this reason, and India relies on its political support and military cooperation to thwart Chinese expansionism in the contested Himalayan border regions and the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, if the United States rebuked India for any pro-Iranian activity, the damage would be severe. US sanctions are powerful, and India cannot afford them. Trump’s sanctions threats prompted India to cease buying Iranian oil in 2019, proving they can deter India considerably.
Ultimately, India’s avoidance of involvement in the war keeps its bilateral relations with the belligerents, at best, at the status quo. Yet, should the war continue, India may be forced to choose between Iran’s resources, on one hand, and America and Israel’s trade and support, on the other. A nation’s neutrality is often ensured by its isolation from a conflict, allowing it to avoid choosing sides. For India, isolation is impossible, and if the war continues, neutrality cannot last forever.
About the Author: Arjun Singh
Arjun Singh is a journalist and political columnist in Washington, DC. He has written for The Wall Street Journal, National Review, The Epoch Times, National Post, and The Daily Caller. He previously lived in India for several years and worked for a member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha.