India often portrays itself as an autonomous power. Critics, however, argue that New Delhi is mainly trying to benefit simultaneously from Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Is India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ genuine or simply opportunism?
Strategic autonomy has deep historical roots in India. It emerged out of the country’s long tradition of non-alignment and reflects a deeply ingrained political belief that India should remain master of its own destiny. That sentiment remains central to the Indian political imagination today. But there is also a practical dimension. India is a country of almost 1.5 billion people with highly diverse needs. No single country or alliance can satisfy all of them. Around 80 per cent of India’s energy resources come from abroad, much of its manufacturing depends on China, advanced technology largely comes from the United States, while defence equipment comes from countries such as Russia, Israel, or France. In that sense, India cannot afford dependence on one bloc alone.
Yet, strategic autonomy has limits. India’s external dependencies constrain its room for manoeuvre, and multi-alignment becomes less effective when everyone else pursues the same strategy – including the United States. Still, India has credible claims to becoming one pole in a future multipolar world. It positions itself as a leading voice of the Global South, calling for reforms of global governance, debt restructuring, and greater climate justice. Even if this approach is partly strategic, there is also a genuine belief in India that the international order cannot remain stable if the interests of the Global South are ignored.
The United States increasingly sees India as a counterweight to China. But despite border clashes and China’s growing influence across Asia, the Modi government still avoids direct confrontation with Beijing. Is India ultimately unwilling to challenge China?
China occupies several different roles in India’s strategic thinking. Unlike the US, India does not see China in purely black-and-white terms. On one level, China is undoubtedly India’s principal geopolitical challenge. The gap in material capabilities is enormous: China’s economic and military power far exceeds India’s. However, China is also a partner in many global conversations. India and China often share positions on questions such as reforming the international order, resisting unilateral sanctions, or pushing back against what they perceive as a Eurocentric system. They cooperate in forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and they work together on issues such as climate change.
China is also India’s neighbour and one of its largest trading partners. Geography cannot be wished away. If India suddenly stopped trading with China, the Indian economy would face serious difficulties. So, China is simultaneously a rival, a partner and an economic necessity. That is why India is reluctant to become an outright anti-China outpost for the US. From the Indian perspective, the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing is fundamentally their conflict, not ours. During the Biden administration, the United States encouraged India to help contain China. But what happens if a future administration changes course and decides to strike a direct bargain with Beijing? India would be left exposed. So, India’s cautious approach has, in many ways, served its interests well. Of course, when the US pushes back against China, that can indirectly benefit India. But India does not want to become directly involved in a confrontation between the world’s two largest powers. It prefers to remain on the sidelines and preserve its strategic flexibility.
India has strengthened its partnerships with the West while still relying on Russian energy and maintaining ties with Iran. With tensions in the Gulf and instability around the Strait of Hormuz, is India’s balancing act becoming unsustainable?
It is certainly becoming more difficult, but it remains necessary. India’s geopolitical position forces it to balance between competing actors. Iran matters because of energy supplies and because it provides access to Central Asia and, potentially, overland routes toward Europe. The Gulf states are essential energy partners as well. At the same time, India depends heavily on the US and Israel for defence cooperation, intelligence and advanced military technology.
No single country or coalition can meet all of India’s strategic and economic needs. That reality pushes India toward maintaining multiple partnerships simultaneously. And there is another important point: India sees itself as a future pole in a multipolar world. A country with that self-image is unlikely to align permanently with any one bloc. This is not merely a tactical calculation. It reflects a deeper historical and political temperament in India. Preserving room for manoeuvre is seen as essential to the country’s identity and long-term strategy.
The instability around the Strait of Hormuz is already affecting India through higher energy prices, inflation and supply-chain disruptions. Has the Indian government overestimated the country’s resilience?
I would frame the issue differently. India did not create this crisis. It is being affected by conflicts initiated elsewhere, just like much of the international system. Under the circumstances, the government has managed the situation relatively well. That said, India’s vulnerability on energy security is real. We have repeatedly faced situations where external powers constrained our options. When India imported oil from Venezuela, the United States objected. When we turned to Iran, there were sanctions pressures again. Then Russia became the alternative. This constant uncertainty illustrates a structural problem: India’s energy security depends heavily on external actors.
As a result, there is now a serious debate in India about energy security as a national security issue. One question being asked is why India’s strategic petroleum reserves cover only around 70 days, whereas countries like Japan maintain reserves for roughly 200 days. Meanwhile, India is moving aggressively toward alternative energy sources. The country has become one of the global leaders in solar energy adoption, and there is growing interest in small modular nuclear reactors. Increasingly, renewable energy and nuclear power are viewed not simply as economic priorities, but as pillars of national security strategy. So yes, India faces vulnerabilities. But these are largely the result of structural external pressures rather than policy mistakes alone. The challenge now is how to reduce those dependencies over time.
Many in the West portray India as the next great superpower. Yet when looking at infrastructure deficits, inequality, unemployment and energy dependence, India can also appear surprisingly fragile. Which picture is more accurate?
Both are true. India is a rich country and a poor country at the same time. It is modern in some respects and deeply underdeveloped in others. It is simultaneously a continental power and a maritime power. On the one hand, India is already one of the world’s largest economies, a nuclear power with one of the world’s largest standing armies, and a country with enormous demographic and geopolitical weight. In terms of sheer scale, India is undoubtedly one of the major powers of the international system. On the other hand, large parts of the population still lack the standard of living associated with developed countries. Poverty, inequality, unemployment, and weak infrastructure remain serious challenges. India has not yet become a high-income society.
So, the answer depends on the question being asked. If the issue is whether India can shape geopolitical outcomes, then yes, it already can. If the question is whether India can provide prosperity and opportunity to all its citizens, then much more remains to be done. That is why I would caution against calling India a future superpower anytime soon. I think that overstates the case. But India is clearly emerging as one of the top four or five powers in the world. There is little doubt about that.
Philosophically speaking, is India a revisionist power seeking to overturn the international order – or a conservative power that simply wants a larger role within it?
India is neither a pure status quo power nor a revolutionary revisionist power. It is fundamentally a reformist power. When previous international orders were created, India was excluded. During the Concert of Europe, only European powers mattered. When the League of Nations emerged after the First World War, India was still colonised. Even in 1945, during the construction of the post-war order, India did not participate as a sovereign power. That historical experience shaped Indian thinking for decades. During the 1950s and 1960s, Indian leaders often spoke in strongly revisionist terms about creating a ‘new international economic order’. But things changed after the economic reforms of the 1990s and India’s gradual integration into the global mainstream.
Today, India benefits from the current order, even if it remains dissatisfied with important aspects of it. India does not want to join China or Russia in trying to fundamentally overturn the system. But it also rejects simply accepting the status quo. What India wants is reform and a more democratic international order that better reflects twenty-first century realities. In that sense, India approaches Europe and the US not with the argument that the system should be destroyed, but that it should be adapted and improved. At its core, India seeks a reformed status quo rather than a revolutionary alternative.
This interview was conducted by Philipp Kauppert.