MADRID— Spain has opened preliminary negotiations with Türkiye over a possible purchase of the Kaan stealth fighter, marking a major shift in Madrid’s (MAD) combat aviation strategy away from dependence on United States-controlled defense ecosystems.
Turkish Aerospace Industries confirmed the discussions during the SAHA 2026 exhibition, as reported by Infodefensa on May 7, 2026.
The talks reflect growing Spanish concern over aging Hornet and Harrier fleets, repeated FCAS delays, and restrictions tied to the F-35 software and sustainment architecture.
Türkiye, operating out of Ankara (ESB), is positioning the twin-engine Kaan as a sovereign combat aviation platform that would let Spain control mission software, electronic warfare integration, and parts of the sustainment chain through domestic industry participation.
Spain Opens Talks with Turkiye
Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) CEO Mehmet Demiroğlu confirmed at SAHA 2026 that Spain and Türkiye had entered into preliminary government-to-government discussions regarding a potential Spanish acquisition of the Kaan.
The talks followed Spain’s October 2025 approval of a €3.12 billion contract for 45 Turkish Hürjet advanced jet trainers under the SAETA II designation, with Airbus España responsible for integrating mission computers and selected avionics.
The negotiations emerged while Spain was confronting four parallel problems. The Spanish Air Force operates an aging EF-18 Hornet fleet, faces the approaching retirement of the AV-8B Harrier force, has suspended F-35 procurement plans, and continues to deal with repeated FCAS program delays.
Turkish officials are positioning the Kaan not simply as a fighter aircraft but as a new procurement model centered on sovereign software control, industrial participation, and reduced dependence on US-controlled sustainment infrastructure.
Aging Spanish Fighter Fleet Drives Procurement Pressure
Spain’s Air Force currently operates roughly 70 EF-18A/B Hornets acquired between 1986 and 1990. Many of these aircraft now have flight hours approaching or exceeding 8,000 after decades of NATO operations and expeditionary deployments.
The Halcón I and Halcón II Eurofighter contracts partially addressed the problem through the acquisition of 45 additional Typhoons, but the FCAS is not expected to reach operational service before 2040.
This timeline leaves a projected capability gap of 10 to 15 years. By 2022, senior Spanish military officials had already concluded that additional fourth-generation fighter upgrades alone would not provide adequate survivability against modern integrated air defense systems.
The F-35A consequently emerged as the preferred operational replacement for parts of the Air Force, but Madrid refrained from procurement because the political leadership prioritized industrial autonomy and European aerospace sovereignty over rapid acquisition of an operational fifth-generation fighter.
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Naval Aviation Challenge and the F-35B Question
The Spanish Navy faces a more restrictive challenge because its fixed-wing aviation capability depends entirely on 12 to 13 EAV-8B+ Harrier II aircraft operated aboard the Juan Carlos I amphibious assault ship.
The vessel lacks catapult launch systems and therefore requires STOVL aircraft, and the F-35B remains the only operational fifth-generation STOVL fighter available internationally.
Rivals like the Kaan, FCAS, GCAP, KF-21, Rafale, and Eurofighter do not possess operational STOVL variants compatible with Spanish naval requirements.
Without the F-35B, Spain would face three alternatives after Harrier retirement. Madrid could abandon fixed-wing naval aviation, reverse its position and purchase the F-35B, or replace Juan Carlos I with a larger catapult-equipped carrier capable of operating conventional naval fighters.
The naval aviation issue, therefore, remains the strongest operational argument favoring eventual Spanish acquisition of at least a limited number of F-35Bs.
Industrial Participation Model Behind the Kaan Offer
Political resistance toward the F-35 accelerated between 2021 and 2025 as Spanish officials increasingly viewed the aircraft as a dependency relationship tied to American-controlled software and sustainment infrastructure.
Mission data files, software updates, electronic warfare databases, logistics management, and deep maintenance remain connected to ODIN and associated US-controlled architecture, which Spanish officials considered incompatible with sovereign operational autonomy.
The Kaan proposal directly targets these concerns by offering Spain authority to integrate national datalinks, domestic mission software, indigenous electronic warfare systems, and sovereign weapons architecture without centralized foreign approval.
Turkish negotiators also emphasized that Spain could retain partial control over avionics adaptation and mission-system customization through domestic industry participation.
Turkish Aerospace Industries structured the Kaan proposal around the same industrial logic established through the Hürjet and SAETA II agreement signed in October 2025. Under that framework, Airbus España manages mission-system integration while Turkish industry provides the aircraft structure.
Companies already associated with the SAETA II ecosystem, including Indra, GMV, Sener, AERTEC, Grupo Oesía, and Orbital, could become involved in future Kaan integration and sustainment activities.
Kaan Program Status and Technical Capabilities
The Kaan remains in prototype and developmental testing after conducting its maiden flight on February 21, 2024, and the program still faces major technological milestones before operational service entry.
Turkish Aerospace Industries plans additional prototypes during 2026 and 2027 to expand testing of avionics, stealth management, mission integration, and aerodynamic performance.
Current prototypes are powered by two General Electric F110 engines derived from the same engine family used by Turkish F-16s, but Türkiye intends to replace them later with the indigenous TF3500 engine currently under development.
Turkish officials continue targeting initial operational capability around 2029, although the timeline remains closely linked to propulsion development and systems integration progress.
The aircraft was designed from the beginning to operate within a manned-unmanned teaming environment involving stealth UCAVs and autonomous support aircraft.
The twin-engine configuration potentially provides greater thrust margins and increased survivability compared to the F-35 single Pratt & Whitney F135 engine.
Turkish Aerospace Industries projects a maximum speed of Mach 1.8 compared to the F-35A’s Mach 1.6, with a payload capacity of up to 10 tons compared to roughly 8.1 tons for the F-35A.
F-35 Retains Operational Maturity Advantages
The F-35 retains major advantages in operational maturity, sensor fusion, stealth credibility, and logistics integration that the Kaan has not yet demonstrated.
More than 1,000 F-35 aircraft have already been produced for over 15 countries, accumulating extensive operational experience across NATO exercises and real combat operations.
The aircraft’s primary advantage lies in its sensor fusion architecture, integrating radar, electronic warfare systems, targeting sensors, datalinks, and offboard network inputs into a unified real-time battlespace picture.
American stealth engineering also benefits from decades of accumulated experience, beginning with the F-117, B-2, and F-22, while Kaan’s true radar cross-section and stealth-maintenance requirements remain unknown because the aircraft has not entered operational service.
Engine Dependency Remains Key Vulnerability
The propulsion issue remains the largest structural vulnerability affecting the Kaan program because Türkiye still depends partially on American engine technology despite positioning the aircraft as an alternative to US-controlled defense ecosystems.
Current Kaan prototypes continue relying on US-made F110 engines, meaning future exports could remain indirectly subject to American licensing approval until the TF3500 becomes operational.
Indigenous fighter engine development remains one of the most difficult sectors within advanced combat aviation because propulsion reliability directly affects fuel efficiency, thermal management, maintenance cycles, stealth integration, and aircraft performance.
Delays inside the TF3500 program could affect production schedules, exportability, sustainment planning, and long-term operating costs for future foreign customers, including Spain.
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FCAS Delays and Spain’s Hedging Strategy
Spain formally remains committed to FCAS through Airbus and Indra participation, but the program continues suffering from persistent disputes between Dassault Aviation and Airbus regarding intellectual property, workshare distribution, and leadership authority.
These disagreements have repeatedly delayed progress, while Germany reportedly warned in 2025 that unresolved tensions could threaten the continuation of the entire program.
Spain nevertheless continues supporting FCAS because withdrawal would weaken its aerospace-industrial position inside Europe and reduce domestic participation in sixth-generation combat aviation technologies.
At the same time, Madrid increasingly appears to be pursuing contingency solutions in case FCAS timelines continue slipping beyond the 2040 horizon.
The Kaan discussions, therefore, function partly as strategic hedging while illustrating the growing fragmentation of Europe’s future combat aviation landscape between FCAS, GCAP, F-35 operators, and emerging external suppliers such as Türkiye and South Korea.
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