(Edited and refined by Candice Chan, with the assistance of AI translation.)
Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to North Korea in seven years last month, North Korean Premier Pak Thae Song promptly travelled to China, while Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), led a delegation to Pyongyang. In line with the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea, high-level exchanges between the two countries have rapidly resumed after a prolonged lull, ushering bilateral relations into a new phase of intensive engagement.
Most observers believe the warming of China-North Korea ties is reflected first of all in closer economic cooperation. China has long been North Korea’s largest trading partner. Even though United Nations sanctions on North Korea remain in place, Beijing can still support the North Korean economy through areas not fully covered by sanctions, including mineral trade, humanitarian assistance, agriculture, healthcare and tourism. Although North Korea has reportedly earned more than US$10 billion in recent years through arms sales to Russia amid the war in Ukraine, such “war dividends” are ultimately limited. To revive trade and develop its economy, North Korea still depends on China as its largest trading partner and principal source of financial support.
Joo Seong-ha, a senior journalist at South Korea’s Dong-A Ilbo, recently cited a source familiar with North Korean affairs as saying that Xi and the North Korean leadership had reportedly reached an unofficial understanding during Xi’s visit. Under the alleged arrangement, any tests involving weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear tests or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), must be reported to China in advance and may only be carried out with China’s approval. In return, China will allow the normal import and export of goods that are currently subject to embargo under United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions against North Korea.
If true, such an arrangement would represent a significant diplomatic achievement for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On the one hand, Pyongyang would secure more stable economic support. On the other, Beijing would gain greater influence over North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities, giving China more room to shape developments on the Korean Peninsula.
Why, then, is Beijing willing to renew its support for North Korea? The answer may lie in the Tumen River.
Japan’s Nikkei and Sankei Shimbun have previously reported that securing access to the sea via the Tumen River may have been one of the key issues discussed during the summit between the Chinese and North Korean leaders.
South Korean television channel Channel A also noted on its programme Now On My Way to Meet You that Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun, who accompanied Xi on the visit, previously served as commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. He is China’s first defence minister with a naval command background, a fact many observers interpret as reflecting Beijing’s growing emphasis on maritime strategy.
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The Tumen River lies at the intersection of China, North Korea and Russia. From Fangchuan village in Hunchun city, Jilin province, it is only about 15 kilometres to the Sea of Japan. However, since the signing of the Convention of Peking in 1860, China has lacked direct access to the Sea of Japan. For over 160 years, this final 15-kilometre stretch has remained effectively blocked, forcing goods from China’s northeastern provinces to be shipped via ports such as Dalian. For Beijing, the Tumen River is not merely about revitalising its northeast region; it is also closely tied to its ambition of becoming a leading maritime power and to the strategic development of logistics corridors across Northeast Asia.
Although Xi made no public mention of the Tumen River during his visit, he did call for the restoration of border checkpoint operations, international passenger rail services and civil aviation links. Many analysts believe these measures represent an important first step towards rebuilding the China-North Korea logistics network.
In recent years, China has steadily advanced cooperation on the Hunchun-Rason project while also holding discussions with Russia on allowing Chinese vessels to reach the sea via the lower reaches of the Tumen River. In May this year, a joint China-Russia statement also pledged to continue trilateral consultations with North Korea, sending a positive signal for the long-stalled Tumen River initiative.
The real obstacle, however, is not the technical feasibility of the waterway but North Korea’s security concerns.
Ryu Hyun-woo, North Korea’s former acting ambassador to Kuwait, believes that Rajin Port is not only an ice-free harbour but also an important military port. Allowing China long-term access to the port, or even permitting Chinese naval vessels to dock there, would directly touch upon Kim Jong Un’s most sensitive concern — the security of his regime. As such, Pyongyang is unlikely to make concessions lightly.
Other experts, however, argue that if China offers sufficiently substantial economic incentives and political assurances, the Tumen River project could well form part of a broader package deal, linked to expanded aid, greater economic and trade cooperation, and even sanctions relief.
Rather than signalling a return to the traditional China-North Korea friendship, the latest warming of bilateral ties is better understood as a fresh round of bargaining centred on security, economic and geopolitical interests. For China, the final 15 kilometres of the Tumen River represent the crucial missing link in securing sea access for its north-eastern region. For North Korea, they constitute a valuable bargaining chip for obtaining aid and political support. If this maritime corridor is eventually opened, it could reshape not only regional logistics but also the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中朝关系升温背后 图们江15公里的战略交易？”.