Japanese Defense Minister Koizumi Shinjiro just arrived in India for the India-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting on August 20. He brings with him a pragmatic doctrine currently reshaping Japanese defense industrial policy conversations: “Defense production is deterrence itself.” Particularly, he has urged the building of a “China-free” supply chain for defense equipment to ease dependency (and undermine China’s ability to weaponize that dependency). To that end, Japan has accelerated opportunities for industrial collaboration with key allies and strategic partners.
As Japan de-risks critical supply chains – covering not only defense inputs but also critical minerals and dual-use components – where does India fit in? Does India-Japan strategic convergence possess the industrial endurance required to build critical supply chains? This is the critical question that should dominate the defense ministers’ dialogue in Delhi tomorrow. Capital commitments, supplier-tier participation, localized production, depth of technology transfer, regulatory alignment, and scalable manufacturing are some of the key parameters to focus on while working toward industrial endurance.
While India-Japan strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific has consolidated in the last two decades, defense technology cooperation remained relatively slow and structurally constrained; there is a marked asymmetry between high-powered diplomacy and uneven industrial integration. Strategic convergence alone is insufficient for building value chains unless it is accompanied by sustained industrial capacity, compatible technology transfer arrangements and institutional conditions that permit cooperation to scale. The first case of co-production of the UNICORN integrated mast (NORA-50) – a stealth antenna tower developed by Japan for naval vessels – serves as a litmus test for bridging the gap between geopolitical ambition, strategic intent, and industrial execution.
The institutional architecture of India-Japan security cooperation is increasingly being reshaped by Japan’s evolving defense-industrial priorities. The 2025 India-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation explicitly calls for technological and industrial collaboration between government entities and private sector stakeholders in sectors critical to national security, including “technology sharing in new fields,” greater mutual understanding of export control policies “to encourage and promote cooperation in high-end technology and equipment and supply chain linkages,” and enhanced “defense R&D cooperation between the Defense Research and Development Organization of India (DRDO) and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency of Japan (ATLA).” Clearly, Tokyo and Delhi are focusing on building resilient technological and industrial linkages. But the challenge remains in translating these institutional commitments into enduring industrial capabilities.
India has welcomed Japan’s latest review of the Three Principles governing the transfer of defense equipment and technology as it aims to pursue a substantive defense industrial partnership. This was emphasized when Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae visited Delhi for the India-Japan Annual Summit last month. Under Takaichi’s Growth Strategy, the defense industry is identified as one of Japan’s 17 strategic fields. Also, the forthcoming Defense Production and Technology Base Strategy is expected to provide a longer-term framework for strengthening Japan’s defense industrial foundation.
Lessons drawn from ongoing conflicts have underscored a shift in Japan’s strategic thinking – a sophisticated platform has limited deterrent value if it cannot be produced at scale, repaired, replenished and sustained under severe strategic disruption. As Japan’s domestic debate intensifies ahead of the National Security Strategy (NSS) revision, securing the industrial foundations of power is a priority. This urgency was underscored in Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper, which argued that states must adapt to “new ways of warfare” – including the mass deployment of unmanned assets and preparation for prolonged conflict.
However, Japan’s defense industrial base faces structural constraints, including a greying workforce and the erosion of second- and third-tier suppliers. Tokyo cannot achieve defense industrial resilience alone – no single country can produce every critical technology or secure every supply chain by itself, something Koizumi has explicitly acknowledged. Consequently, Japan is seeking trusted networks and dependable technological partners through co-development and co-production aimed at easing vulnerabilities during strategic disruption.
India emerges as a viable option owing to its expanding defense industrial capacity and scale. However, tangible deliverables will be contingent on bridging strategic expectations. Delhi demands deep localization, domestic value addition, and technology absorption; Tokyo prioritizes intellectual property safeguards, technology security, and strict end-use controls. The next phase of defense industry cooperation will be determined by how India and Japan address these divergences in crafting a pragmatic template for technology sharing, joint production, and long-term supply chain resilience.
One area where Delhi and Tokyo should effectively leverage their complementary strengths is unmanned systems. Joint efforts across drone development, manufacturing, and testing are already at work, forging a solid foundation for this partnership. Indian firms such as ideaForge are exploring next-generation unmanned systems with Japanese partners. Japanese drone manufacturer ACSL has established an Indian presence to support manufacturing and supply chain localization. Cooperation between the Drone Federation of India and the Fukushima Robot Test Field is also creating links in testing infrastructure and technical expertise. Unmanned systems enable India and Japan to collaborate across AI, sensors, autonomy, communications, manufacturing, testing and maintenance – creating opportunities to build capabilities together.
Traditionally, India-Japan defense-industrial cooperation has been defined by risk-averse execution, modest incremental gains, and slow-emerging operational promise. The ShinMaywa US-2 experience demonstrated how political goodwill and strategic intent is not enough when negotiations encounter the colossal challenges of defense procurement, domestic value creation, and industrial cooperation. The modest steps taken through DRDO-ATLA cooperation suggest a more incremental path, while the latest UNICORN antenna project represents a more meaningful move toward joint production and industrial integration.
For India and Japan, the priority should be working toward true industrial co-creation aimed at creating sustainable defense capabilities. This would imply harmonizing export controls, defining clear tech-sharing protocols, and catalyzing private-sector investment to insulate the defense industrial partnership against political cycles and bureaucratic delays.