On the night of May 6-7 last year, India launched Operation Sindoor, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The operation was in response to a gruesome terrorist attack at Pahalgam in the Kashmir Valley on April 22, 2025, which left 26 people, all male civilians and mostly Hindu, dead. The Indian government pointed to the “cross-border linkages of the terrorist attack” and blamed Pakistan.
Operation Sindoor began with India carrying out air and missile strikes on terrorist camps, including the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan retaliated the following day, and the exchanges quickly escalated into a four-day military conflict between India and Pakistan. A ceasefire came into effect on May 10.
In the months following the military exchanges, Indian leaders and officials said that New Delhi’s approach to terrorist attacks henceforth would be “firm, decisive and unwavering.” Another terror attack would trigger a strong response from India, they warned. An assessment of recent trends indicates that the space for restraint is narrowing and escalation dynamics are changing.
Domestically, there are political incentives for the Indian and Pakistani governments to posture aggressively and project military strength against each other. In recent years, each crisis has only upped the ante and lowered the escalatory threshold.
Public expectations for a robust retaliation to what is seen to be a Pakistan-backed terrorist attack have risen significantly, narrowing the space for restraint. The role of real-time media coverage and social media amplification further intensifies public pressure, limiting maneuvering space for governments. The limited scope for backchannel diplomacy compounds this, as years of bilateral animosity have severed most official channels of communication.
The public’s view of the crisis’ outcome and the ability to control domestic narratives will guide the future actions of both governments. Perception has become increasingly important in modern warfare, shaping international opinion and often determining claims of victory and the status of a conflict. Both sides genuinely believe, or have at least successfully convinced their domestic audience, that they emerged victorious in face-offs.
Following any terrorist attack, the Indian state has set expectations for itself, increasing pressure on itself to not only act decisively but swiftly. After the Pahalgam attack, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated clearly that any terrorist attack would be met with a “befitting response on our terms… at every place from where the roots of terrorism emerge.” It clarified that India will not be constrained by any diplomatic pressure or by norms set in the past, but will go ahead to target not just attackers, but also the roots of these terror groups – their planners, sponsors, and protectors. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh further added that any attack on Indian soil will be considered an act of war.
Additionally, New Delhi no longer faces the same concerns of attribution. In the past, India would spend much time and energy on convincing the world of Pakistan’s culpability. Space for retaliation was therefore limited.
Many countries condemned the Pahalgam attack, and although they may not have officially named the aggressor, India was not under excessive pressure to showcase proof of Pakistani culpability. India’s blaming of Islamabad was not questioned by any major power, except for some of Pakistan’s very close allies and smaller countries, such as Greece, Switzerland, Spain, Slovenia, and Malaysia. This is a significant break from the past, and one that has grown stronger with each major terror attack on India. India has thus reduced Pakistan’s ability to delay, deny, or internationalize such attacks.
This now sets a precedent wherein any major pressure from international actors on India for external investigation of terror attacks or calls for restraint and a response short of kinetic action will not enjoy popular domestic support.
India’s stance suggests a change in the distinction it draws between terrorist groups based out of Pakistan and those with direct links to the Pakistani state apparatus.
India has long maintained that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. However, in 2008, after the terror attacks in Mumbai, since it did not want an escalating India-Pakistan conflict to divert attention from the global fight against terrorism, the Indian government chose not to retaliate militarily. Another reason was Delhi’s lack of preparedness at that time for a military confrontation.
Presently, India seems less tethered to making a distinction between the terror groups and the state of Pakistan itself and is determined to push harder on the message of Pakistan’s endemic involvement in terrorism. Modi’s statement soon after the cessation of hostilities, when he underlined India’s new strategic response to terrorism, indicated this willingness to hold Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus directly accountable.
During the May crisis, India provided Pakistan with an off-ramp by limiting strikes initially only to terrorist infrastructure and avoiding military targets, contrary to operational logic. However, Islamabad’s aggressive response to India’s attack last year and New Delhi’s “new parameter and new normal” as mentioned by Modi in this same May 12 speech raises questions over the durability of this restraint.
Militarily, both sides have acquired important operational insights and battlefield lessons for future engagements. The pace of military technological development is rapid, fueling further uncertainty over the next crisis. For instance, the May crisis saw the two sides use several weapons systems that neither side had fielded during the 2019 crisis.
Technological precision and stand-off strikes have limited risks and cause limited collateral damage, increasing the risk appetite on both sides. The advantage of surprise will also be reduced with each future confrontation, as a precedent has been set. Crucially, surprise here is no longer about whether a response will occur, but rather about its exact timing, location, type of targets, and mode of execution.
Another key takeaway from Sindoor has been the ability of both sides to calibrate escalation, without breaching the nuclear threshold. New Delhi has clearly asserted that the “nuclear blackmail” will not constrain its responses. The result is a shifting strategic environment, as the space for military action is expanding and both India and Pakistan may be growing comfortable with increasing risk. Here, de-escalation rests on the belief that neither side will escalate to the point of forcing a choice between humiliation and nuclear conflict. In such a scenario, the real danger is not escalation itself, but the increasing belief that escalation can be managed.
Some major developments in Pakistan since last year’s India-Pakistan confrontation need to be factored in to assess the future trajectory of bilateral relations.
One is that Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have deteriorated, especially after the launch of its Ghazab Lil Haq operations against Afghanistan in February this year. In addition to the tense Indian border, the Pakistani military now faces a hostile situation vis-à-vis Afghanistan, stretching its armed forces. Islamabad has often used anti-India sentiment for domestic consolidation and to divert attention.
Additionally, the security situation along Pakistan’s border with Iran is fragile as well. The Iran war could trigger a flow of refugees into Pakistan. While relations with Iran are at present warm, Pakistan could easily get drawn into that war.
Another development is Pakistan’s restructuring of its political system and balance of power through the 27th Constitutional Amendment, which reduces judicial power, centralizes power in the army, and grants greater privileges to senior military officials. General Asim Munir has risen as a dominant player in Pakistan’s political arena and his stature has grown in global geopolitics. The external validation of Pakistan and of Munir in particular by the United States could encourage Pakistani military adventurism, with ramifications for India.
These bilateral risks are unfolding alongside a broader transformation in the region and the international system. In the last few years, almost every country in South Asia has experienced domestic upheavals, plunging the region into chaos and instability. The geopolitical environment also contributes to growing strategic permissiveness and can have a direct impact on the conflict trajectory. Armed conflict is becoming more common globally, the rules-based international order is under severe strain, and mechanisms to defuse tensions are weaker than ever before. Various other competing conflicts have also diverted international attention away from terrorism.
Thus, the risks of conflicts escalating and possible miscalculations loom over India and Pakistan. The next crisis involving the two nuclear-armed neighbors will be shaped by compressed timelines, louder domestic pressures, weaker external constraints, and a growing belief that escalation can be controlled.